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Demythologizing PHOSITA
Applying the Non-Obviousness Requirement Under
Canadian Patent Law to Keep Knowledge in the Public
Domain and Foster Innovation
MATTHEW HERDER*
The Supreme Court of Canada recently revised the doctrine of non-obviousness in a phar-
maceutical "selection patent" case, Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. Although
the Court was cognizant of changes to the same doctrine in the United States and the United
Kingdom, a critical flaw in how the doctrine is being applied in Canada escaped its atten-
tion. Using content analysis methodology, this article shows that Canadian courts frequently
fail to characterize the "person having ordinary skill in the art" IPHOSITA) for the purpose
of the obviousness inquiry. The article argues that this surprisingly common analytical
mistake betrays a deep misunderstanding of innovation-one which assumes that actors
consult patents to learn about scientific developments, devalues the importance of the
public domain, and ignores the industry-specific nature of innovation. The article also
describes the historical evolution of the non-obviousness test, identifies factors that un-
dermine PHOSITA's characterization, and develops a multi-layered prescription to remedy
the problem.
Derni~rement, [a Cour supreme du Canada a r~vis6 [a doctrine de non-6vidence lors d'une
affaire de " brevet de s6lection >) pharmaceutique 6 savoir, Apotex Inc. c. Sanofi-Synthdlabo
Canada Inc. Bien que La Cour 6tait consciente des changements 6 [a m~me doctrine aux
Itats-Unis et au Royaume-Uni, une faille critique dans Ia mani~re dont [a doctrine est ap-
p!iqu6e au Canada a 6chapp6 A son attention. Au moyen de [a m~thodologie de l'analyse du
contenu, cetarticle d6montre que les tribunaux canadiens 6chouent souvent A qualifier [a (
personne dou6e de [a comp6tence normale dans le m6tier> (PHOSITA] aux fins de l'enqu6-
te sur 1'6vidence. L'article avance que cette erreur analytique, 6tonnement r6pandue, r6v~le
une incompr6hension profonde de l'innovation, laquelle assume que les protagonistes
consultent les brevets en vue de s'informer sur les progr6s scientifiques, d6vatorise t'im-
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portance du domaine public et enfin, ignore La nature de Linnovation propre , Lindustrie.
Par aitteurs, L'article d6crit L'6volution historique du test de non 6vidence, identifie Les fac-
teurs qui 6branLent La qualification de [a PHOSITA, et met au point une solution 6 ptusieurs
niveaux en vue de r6soudre le probL~me.
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THE DOCTRINE OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS is intended to ensure that an invention
be a non-trivial extension of what is already known-in other words, that a
1. This framing of the doctrine's purpose is well established in the United States. See generally
Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, eds., Patent Law and Policy: Cases and
Materials, 3d ed. (Newark: LexisNexis, 2002) at 644ff. In marked contrast, Canadian courts
seldom examine the purpose of the non-obviousness requirement. For an exception to this
general trend, see Apotex Inc. v. Syntex Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (1999), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 22 at
para. 62 (F.C.T.D.).
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patent's claims do not encompass knowledge that is effectively already part of the
"public domain."2 That is the doctrine's essential purpose. Wary that requiring
the subject matter simply be "new" and "useful" would reward mere work-shop
improvements with a time-limited legal monopoly, the judiciary added non-
obviousness or "inventive step" (as it is referred to in Europe3 and elsewhere') to
the criteria of a "true invention," despite the "obvious" circularity involved.'
Defining with greater precision what the non-obviousness requirement should
entail has remained elusive. Instead, over time, courts have devised imaginative
analytical protocols so as to manage the inquiry.6 Assessing whether the putative
invention would have been obvious to the "skilled technician" or the "person
having ordinary skill in the art" (the "PHOSITA") has become the defining
feature of the protocol for determining obviousness in several of the world's
patent systems.7
Many allege that the obviousness inquiry had run amuck in the United
States-that, contrary to the US Supreme Court's direction in the 1966 case of
Graham v. John Deere Co.8 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had
2. Usage of this particular phrase, "the public domain," in relation to intellectual property
rights (indcluding copyrights, patents, and trademarks) is actually relatively new. See James
Boyle, "The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain"
(2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33 at 59. Nevertheless, the idea of using the non-
obviousness requirement to distinguish what is already known from what is not is quite old.
See Part I(A), below.
3. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 5 October 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, art.
52(1). The article reads: "European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step."
4. India and Australia's patent statutes, for example, both use the term "inventive step." See,
respectively, The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 No. 15 of 2005; PatentsAct 1990 (Cth.), s. 7.
5. John F. Witherspoon, ed., Nonobviousness: The Ultimate Condition of Patentability
(Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1980).
6. For good reason: non-obviousness is the most commonly litigated issue in patent disputes
today. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, "Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents" (1998) 26 A.I.P.L.A.Q.J. 185 at 209.
7. This term is more commonly used in the United States than in Canada. Nevertheless, it
will be used throughout this article, both to highlight how developments in the United
States are relevant to the analysis and to reveal a problem in the Canadian jurisprudence
attributable to the conflation of the skilled reader (and his or her role in claim construction)
with the ordinary technician (and his or her function in the obviousness inquiry). See Part
V, below.
8. 383 U.S. 1 (1966) [Graham].
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gradually "marginalized" PHOSITA from the obviousness test.! In. 2007, how-
ever, the Supreme Court resuscitated PHOSITA in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc. et al.,1 reasserting his or her ability to rely upon common sense and
draw inferences from information while overcoming a technological hurdle."
On behalf of a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy underscored the importance
of knowledge in the public domain to innovation:
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality around us new
works based on instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and
sometimes even genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge, define a
new threshold from which innovation starts once more. And as progress beginning
from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.
12
By signalling a more sophisticated understanding of the relationships be-
tween the public domain, proprietary knowledge, and innovation, some contend
that the US Supreme Court finally saw the forest for the trees in KSR."3 Others
worry that the ruling's application will leave much to be desired because particu-
lar aspects of the non-obviousness standard left unaddressed by the Court-
"the trees," to twist the metaphor-matter greatly."
9. According to the following commentators, the "teaching, suggestion, motivation" (TSM)
test developed by the Federal Circuit is one of the principal reasons why PHOSITA has been
marginalized. See John H. Barton, "Non-Obviousness" (2003) 43 IDEA 475; Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, "Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA'
(2004) 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 885. But see Christopher A. Cotropia, "Nonobviousness and
the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law" (2007) 82 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 911.
10. 550 U.S. 398 (2007) [KSR].
11. In this case, the Federal Circuit invoked the TSM test to determine that the adjustable
electronic sensor gasoline pedal at issue was non-obvious, even though both adjustable
accelerator pedals and electronic sensors on (non-adjustable) accelerator pedals were known
in the prior art.
12. KSR, supra note 10 at 1750-5 1.
13. See e.g. Ron A. Bouchard, "KSR v. Telefx Part 1: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Patent Law
on Canadian Intellectual Property and Regulatory Rights Landscape" (2007) 15 Health L.J. 221.
14. See e.g. Gregory N. Mandel, "Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court's Failure to
Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex" (2008) 12 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 323; Janice M. Mueller, "Chemicals, Combinations, and 'Common Sense':
How the Supreme Court's KSR Decision is Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness
Determinations in Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cases" (2008) 35 N. Ky. L. Rev. 281.
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Even if KS's application proves troublesome, the situation may be worse
in Canada. Although decided after KSR, the Supreme Court of Canada argua-
bly saw neither the forest nor the trees while reformulating the standard of non-
obviousness in Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc."5 Instead, paying
no heed to Justice Kennedy's words in KSR, the Court, along with lower Cana-
dian courts, continues to devalue the public domain vis-h-vis patents, to the
detriment of our innovation system as a whole. This deep misunderstanding
of innovation is rooted in a simple, yet surprisingly common analytical mistake:
in applying the non-obviousness doctrine, courts frequently fail to adequately
characterize, through specific findings of fact, the knowledge and capacities
of the PHOSITA' 6-the very tool used to distinguish between inventions that
are obvious, and, therefore, already part of the public domain, versus those that
are not.
Perhaps the gravity of the issue would have been cast in sharper relief if
leave to appeal had been granted in a separate proceeding, Novopharm Limited
v. Janssen-Ortho Inc.,"7 given that legal counsel for Novopharm also represented
KSR, the brake pedal system manufacturer that successfully defended itself
against allegations of patent infringement in the United States. 8 Within a month
of the KSR ruling, counsel for Novopharm filed leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada, alleging, inter alia, that the Federal Court of Appeal wrongly
determined the issue of obviousness. 9
15. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265 [Apotex (2008)]. This case, pertaining to the multi-billion dollar drug
"Plavix," was commenced pursuant to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations, S.C.R. 93-133 [PMNOC Regulations]. As such, the Supreme Court of Canada's
ruling does not constitute a final determination of issues of patent validity or infringement
(although the latter was not at issue in this case). Rather, the Court simply determined that
the three allegations of invalidity (based on anticipation, obviousness, and double patenting)
made by Apotex were not justified (at para. 116).
16. This mistake is also quite ironic, given Rothstein J.'s call to move beyond "acontextual"
applications of patent standards. See Apotex (2008), ibid. at para. 62.
17. (2007), 59 C.P.R. (4th) 116 (F.C.A.) [Novopharm (2007)].
18. This statement is not intended to imply that the same counsel who represented KSR before
the US Supreme Court also appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada in connection
with Novopharm's application for leave.
19. See Novopharm (2007), supra note 17, Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal of the
Applicant (S.C.C. File No. 32200) at para. 7 [Novopharm (2007), Application for Leave
to Appeal].
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In its application for leave, Novopharm conceded that its case presented
issues parallel to those raised by Sanofi-Sythelabo Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,20
which the Supreme Court of Canada had at that point already agreed to hear but
had not decided.21 Both cases involved the same subject matter: a drug composed
of a chemical compound known as an "enantiomer. ' '2  And both raised the same
fundamental question: could a drug that is itself a member of a previously-
disclosed (and patented) class of compounds be claimed in a subsequent patent?
Like the appellant in Apotex (2008), counsel in Novopharm (2007) submitted
that such "selection patents,"23 as they are commonly called, are invalid because
they are obvious and that the Court should hear its case, if only in conjunction
with Apotex's appeal.2
However, that is not what transpired. Novopharm's application for leave
to appeal was dismissed and, in the process of substantially altering the test of
obviousness under Canadian law, the issue of how PHOSITA is characterized
completely escaped the Court's attention in Apotex (2008).2s
The argument advanced here is that this outcome is fundamentally problem-
atic. It is problematic because the manner in which the Federal Court of Appeal
characterized PHOSITA in Novopharm (2007), as well as in Apotex (2006)-
or, to be more precise, the manner in which it failed to characterize PHOSITA-
appears to be a pervasive feature of the jurisprudence. And, if left uncorrected,
this feature will compromise the patent system's principal function of stimulat-
ing and facilitating innovation. 2
20. (2006), 282 D.L.R. (4th) 179 (F.C.A.) [Apotex (2006)], aff'g (2005), 39 C.P.R. (4th) 202
(F.C.T.D.) [Apotex (2005)].
21. Apotex (2006), ibid., leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, Apotex (2008), supra note 15.
22. The drug in both the Novopharm and the Apotex cases was developed from a racemic
compound, which is typically composed of two otherwise identical molecules called
"enantiomers" .that have three-dimensional structures that are mirror images of each other.
23. Rothstein J. defined "selection patents" as follows: "In the context of chemical compounds,
in general terms, a selection patent is one whose subject matter (compounds) is a fraction of
a larger known class of compounds which was the subject matter of a prior patent." Apotex
(2008), supra note 15 at para. 1.
24. See Novopharm (2007), Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 19 at para. 9.
25. This may have been partially attributable to the fact that the two parties did not dispute
PHOSITA's identity. See Apotex (2008), supra note 15 at para. 74.
26. This article assumes that this is the case. However, the purpose of the Canadian patent
system merits further inquiry, especially from a comparative constitutional perspective, given
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There are essentially two reasons for this. First, the patent system's function
of promoting innovation will, in the future, increasingly depend upon a court's
ability to calibrate patent law standards, including non-obviousness, in light of
the realities of particular industries." PHOSITA is the primary doctrinal tool at
a court's disposal to perform such calibration. 28 Failing to deploy the PHOSITA
construct fully, then, not only handicaps judicial analysis, but also threatens the
integrity of the patent system. Second, undermining PHOSITA's role in the
non-obviousness inquiry devalues the public domain of knowledge2 9-a sphere
which, depending on the industry involved, and contrary to what members of
the Supreme Court of Canada appear to believe, is just as, if not more, impor-
tant to innovation than proprietary knowledge, such as patented inventions.
In summary, the overarching purpose of this article is to expose the present
gap between patent law doctrine-specifically, the non-obviousness doctrine-
and innovation, in theory and in practice. It will explain why this gap is a prob-
lem, how Apotex and related decisions perpetuate it, and what should be done
to correct it. The two methodologies employed to investigate this problem and
substantiate the foregoing claims are described in detail in Part II of the article.
Parts III and IV present empirical findings generated through content analysis
(methodology one) and a critique of the jurisprudence based on doctrinal
analysis (methodology two), respectively. Finally, Part V offers a multi-layered
prescription for the problem. The following provides historical background
about the evolution of the non-obviousness doctrine-a necessary primer for
the content analysis coding scheme described in Part II.3
that the UK Constitution Act simply grants the federal government jurisdiction over "Patents
of Invention and Discovery." See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(22)
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. Other jurisdictions, most notably the United States,
attach a clear purpose to certain intellectual property laws. The US Constitution indicates
that: "Congress shall have the power ... To promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For an informative discussion of
this particular clause's purpose, see Malla Pollack, "What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?
Defining 'Progress' in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or
Introducing the Progress Clause" (2001) 80 Neb. L. Rev. 754.
27. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can
Solve It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
28. Ibid. at 114-17.
29. See Parts IV and V, below.
30. The author acknowledges that the methodology section should typically follow the
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I. NON-OBVIOUSNESS: A PRIMER
This Part is divided into three sections. The first two detail the origins of the
non-obviousness-doctrine and review the analytical protocols adopted in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada (at least prior to Apotex). The
third explains in depth how the Federal Court of Appeal characterized PHO-
SITA in Novopharm (2007) and Apotex (2006). Because the issues uncovered
here were not raised before the Supreme Court of Canada, a discussion of the
changes made to the doctrine of non-obviousness in deciding Apotex's appeal is
postponed until Part V of the article.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NON-OBVIOUSNESS TEST AND PHOSITA
(GENERALLY) DEFINED
Novelty and utility have always been integral to the notion of invention under
Canadian patent statutes. The definition of "invention" under the present Patent
Act reads: "Any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter."31
Both criteria have, however, proven relatively easy thresholds to overcome
in order to obtain a patent in Canada, as elsewhere.32 Conversely, disproving
the novelty or utility of an invention as a defence to patent infringement is typi-
cally difficult. One must produce a single piece of prior art that teaches every
essential element of the patented invention to demonstrate that an invention is
not new.33 Courts seldom find that the prior art so anticipates. " Successfully
demonstrating that an invention is not useful is likewise rare. Minimal utility
will normally suffice.3"
introduction. However, further background about the law of non-obviousness is critical to
understanding why particular variables were chosen for the content analysis.
31. R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 2.
32. Merges & Duffy, supra note 1 at 643.
33. Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Velmet Oy (1986), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289 at 297 (F.C.A.) [Beloit].
34. See the empirical findings in Part III, below.
35. According to the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), an invention will be
deemed useful if it relates to a useful art, is "operable, controllable, and reproducible," has
some economic result, and is more than a "mere scientific principle or abstract theorem."
Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Manual of Patent Office Practice, 1998 ed. (Ottawa-
Gatineau: Patent Office, 2009) c. 12 ("Utility and Subject Matter") at 12.08, 12.05.01,
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Courts have thus long espoused the view that an invention should entail
"something more" than novelty and utility to be patentable. The Exchequer
Court, for instance, stated in 1931:
To support a valid patent there must be something more than a new and useful
manufacture, it must have involved somehow the application of the inventive mind:
the invention must have required for its evolution some amount of ingenuity to con-
stitute subject matter, or in other words invention.
36
Yet, in so holding, courts are immediately confronted with a paradox: pos-
sessing "something more" may be crucial, but defining what that is seems to
border on the impossible. In Canada v. Uhlemann Optical Co.,37 Justice Thorson
of the Privy Council stated:
No one has really succeeded in defining ... the difference between an advance that is
obvious as a workshop improvement and one that involves inventive ingenuity. One
of the difficulties is that there is no objective standard of invention. What one person
might regard as inventive another would consider as obvious.
38
One of the most colourful jurists of his time, Justice Learned Hand of the
Circuit Court for the District of New York, stated that determining what con-
stitutes a true invention is "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phan-
tom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts."
39
Various formulations of a test to determine the obviousness of an invention
were nonetheless put forth, beginning in the United States. A ruling from 1850,
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood," is the earliest formulation of a requirement resem-
bling non-obviousness. In Hotchkiss, the US Supreme Court held that a door-
knob invention was not patentable "unless more ingenuity and skill in applying
the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the appli-
cation of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business."'1 Although it is unclear whether the ma-
online: <http://strategis.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/chapitre12-
chapter 12-eng.pdf/$file/chapitre1 2-chapter 12-eng.pdf>.
36. Canadian Gypsum Co. Ltd v. Gypsum, Lime & Alabastine, Canada Ltd., [1931] Ex. C.R. 180.
37. [1950] Ex. C.R. 142 [Uhlemann Optical].
38. Ibid. at para. 30.
39. Harriesv. Air King Products, 183 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1950) at 162.
40. 52 U.S. 248 (1850) [Hotchkiss].
41. Ibid. at 267 [emphasis added].
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jority was attempting to capture something beyond novelty when the opinion is
read in its entirety, modern day PHOSITA, or at least the US version thereof,
is often traced back to this particular passage in Hotchkiss.1
2
In the United Kingdom, counsel by the name of Sir Stafford Cripps sup-
plied what would become the hallmark formulation of the test. In Sharpe &
Dohme Inc. v. Boots Pure Drug Coy. Ld.," the English Court of Appeal quoted
the following "Cripps question" with approval:
Was it obvious to any skilled chemist, in the state of chemical knowledge existing at the
date of the Patent, that he could manufacture valuable therapeutic agents by making
the higher alkyl resorcinols by the use of the condensation and reduction processes
described? If the answer is "No" the Patent is valid as regards subject-matter; if "Yes"
the Patent is not valid."
While Canadian courts do not seem to have been influenced by Hotchkiss
and the evolving non-obviousness doctrine south of the border, they did even-
tually integrate the Cripps question into Canadian patent law. In Burns & Rus-
sell of Canada Ltd. v. Day & Campbell Limited," the Exchequer Court accepted
the Cripps question in principle, even though it did not find it applicable to the
case at bar. In 1979, however, Justice Pigeon of the Supreme Court of Canada
finally applied the Cripps question in Hoechst v. Halocarbon (Ontario) Ltd. et a/6
Despite the fact that the Cripps question casts PHOSITA in relatively be-
nign terms-someone skilled but ordinary-courts have long shown a tendency
to describe PHOSITA more pejoratively. This might, in part, be attributable to
how the question of non-obviousness was framed before PHOSITA entered on
the scene. In The Edison Bell Phonograph Corporation, Limited v. Smith and
Young, 7 for instance, the House of Lords stated:
It really comes to this, that, although the invention is new-that is, that nobody has
thought of it before-and although it is useful, yet, when you consider it, you come to
the conclusion that it is so easy, so palpable, that everybody who thought for a mo-
42. See e.g. L. James Harris, "Section 103 Revisited" (1966) 9 Pat. Trademark & Copy. J. Res.
& Ed. 617 at 619.
43. (1928), 45 R.P.C. 153.
44. Ibid. at 162-63 [emphasis added].
45. [19661 Ex. C.R. 673 at 681-82.
46. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 929 at 945 [Halocarbon].
47. (1894), 11 R.P.C. 389.
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ment would come to the same conclusion; or, in more homely language, hardly judi-
cial, but rather business like, it comes to this, it is so easy that any fool could do it.48
While that may no longer be an accurate description, PHOSITA is regu-
larly qualified as "unimaginative," "uncreative," or "non-innovative.""' Justice
Hugessen's portrays PHOSITA in Beloit as follows:
The test for obviousness is not to ask what competent inventors did or would have
done to solve the problem. Inventors are by definition inventive. The classical touch-
stone for obviousness is the technician skilled in the art but having no scintilla of in-
ventiveness or imagination; a paragon of deduction and dexterity, wholly devoid of
intuition; a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right. The question to be asked
is whether this mythical creature (the man in the Clapham omnibus of patent law)
would, in the light of the state of the art and of common general knowledge as at the
claimed date of invention, have come directly and without difficulty to the solution
taught by the patent. It is a very difficult test to satisfy.
50
Although the non-obviousness requirement is now codified by statute in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada (see Table 1), the influence
of the common law remains crucial." While KSR promises to .re-shape the ap-
plication of the requirement in the United States, Justice Hugessen's eccentric
words in Beloit have embodied the test for non-obviousness (and the attributes
of PHOSITA) in Canada for over twenty years.5 2
B. TEST AS ANALYTICAL PROTOCOL: JURISDICTIONAL IDIOSYNCRASIES
In addition to variations in how PHOSITA's capacities are generally defined,
courts in different jurisdictions have developed different analytical protocols
to manage the non-obviousness inquiry. In Graham, the US Supreme Court
48. Ibid. at 398.
49. See e.g. Procter 6& Gamble Co. v. Beecham Canada Ltd. (1982), 61 C.P.R. (2d) 1 at 27
(F.C.A.) [Beecham].
50. Supra note 33 at 294.
51. Of course, the statute trumps in the event of any inconsistency. For example, under Beloit,
the relevant date upon which to assess obviousness was the "claimed date of invention," to be
ascertained as a matter of fact. Ibid. at 294. However, amendments made to the PatentAct,
as Canada moved to a "first-to-file" (as opposed to "first-to-invent") system, have required
the assessment to be made at the date of patent application filing. See Patent Act, supra note
31, ss. 28.3, 27.1.
52. In Apotex (2008), supra note 15, the Supreme Court of Canada created a new framework for
analyzing the issue of obviousness.
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TABLE 1: STATUTORY FORMULATIONS OF THE NON-OBVIOUSNESS REQUIREMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND CANADA
103. A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
3. An invention shall be taken to involve an inventive step if it is not
obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter
which.forms part of the state of the art by virtue only of section 2(2)
above (and disregarding section 2(3) above).
2(2) The state of the art in the case of an invention shall be taken to
comprise all matter (whether a product, a process, information about
either, or anything else) which has at any time before the priority date
of that invention been made available to the public (whether in the
United Kingdom or elsewhere) by written or oral description, by use
or in any other way.
28.3 The subject-matter defined by a claim in an application for a
patent in Canada must be subject-matter that would not have been
obvious on the claim date to a person skilled in the art or science to
which it pertains, having regard to
(a) information disclosed more than one year before the filing date by
the applicant, or by a person who obtained knowledge, directly or
indirectly, from the applicant in such a manner that the information
became available to the public in Canada or elsewhere; and
(b) information disclosed before the claim date by a person not men-
tioned in paragraph (a) in such a manner that the information became
available to the public in Canada or elsewhere.
parsed section 103 into four discrete steps:
Under § 103, [1] the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; [2] dif-
ferences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; ahd [3]
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. [4] Against this background,
the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secon-
dary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the ori-
gin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or non-
obviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.
53




(U.K.), 1977, c. 37, s. 3
PatentAct, R.S.C. 1985,
c. P-4, s. 28.3
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Putting aside the reference to "secondary considerations" for the moment,
the test governing the obviousness inquiry in the United Kingdom bears a broad
resemblance to the protocol envisaged in Graham. As originally formulated by
the English Court of Appeal, the test espoused in Windsurfing International Inc.
v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd.' entails the following four steps:
The first step is to identify the inventive concept embodied by the patent in suit.
Thereafter, the court has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but unimagi-
native addressee in the art at the priority date and to impute to him what was, at that
date, common general knowledge in the art in question. The third step is to identify
what, if any differences exist between the matter cited as being "known or used" and
the alleged invention. Finally, the court has to ask itself whether viewed without any
knowledge of the alleged invention, those differences constitute steps which would have
been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require any degree of invention.
55
Lord Justice Jacob recently reformulated the Windsurfing test in Pozzoli
SPA v. BDMO SA as follows:
1) (a) Identify the notional "skilled person in the art";
(b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;
2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot be readily
done, construe it;
3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of
the "state of the art" and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;
4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those dif-
ferences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the
art or do they require any degree of invention?
5 6
The Lord Justice's reasons for reformulating the test reveal the relative pri-
macy of PHOSITA over the prior art in the United Kingdom as compared to the
United States. A re-ordering of the first two steps was necessary because, as he
describes, it is "only through the eyes of the skilled man that one [can] properly
understand what such a man would understand the patentee to have meant and
thereby set about identifying the [inventive] concept.""7 Under the Graham
54. (1985] R.P.C. 59 [Windsurfing].
55. Ibid. at 73.
56. [2007] EWCA Civ 588 at para. 14 [Pozzoli].
57. Ibid. at para. 15.
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protocol, in contrast, PHOSITA is not even explicitly named. This perhaps
partly explains the onset (and increasingly rigid application) of a requirement
that some explicit or implicit "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine
various bits of information must exist in the prior art for an invention to be
found obvious. Dissociated from the person-even a fictitious one-who might
be shown (based on evidence) to be capable of synthesizing various sources of
information, the prior art (and what it does or does not reveal by explicit or
implicit teaching, motivation, or suggestion) became all-important in the United
States, at least prior to KSR. 8
Note, however, that the process of determining whether an alleged invention
is obvious in both jurisdictions involves some degree of claim construction: dif-
ferences between the prior art and the patent's claims are to be identified under
steps two and three of the American and English tests, respectively.59 In Canada,
the scope of the invention in question vis- -vis the prior art and/or PHOSITA
is instead loosely described as one factor amongst several in a non-exhaustive list
of factors that may or may not help decide the issue of obviousness."
C. MORE SPECIFIC FACT-FINDING: SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS AND
PHOSITA CHARACTERIZATION
Within the parameters of the applicable non-obviousness test and correspond-
ing protocol,61 courts in all three jurisdictions are supposed to arrive at several
58. Provided the TSM test is not applied in an excessively rigid manner (for example, so as to
preclude the PHOSITA from looking at prior art designed to solve the same problem, or
from relying upon his or her common sense) then it remains good law. See KSR, supra note
10 at 1743.
59. In contrast, claim construction has historically been framed as a distinct, antecedent exercise
in Canada. See Free World Trust v. iElectro Santi Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024 at para. 19 [Free
World Trust]; Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067 at para. 43 [Whirlpool].
Apotex changed this, however, with the Supreme Court of Canada adopting the test put forth
by Jacob L.J. in Pozzoli, supra note 56. As a result, a degree of claim construction has now
been incorporated into the Canadian obviousness analysis.
60. Novopharm (2007), supra note 17 at para. 27.
61. Whereas courts'in the United States and the United Kingdom clearly view the test as a
procedure to be determined in a step-wise fashion, Canadian courts appear to view obviousness
as a singular question, with Hugessen J.'s words in Beloit representing the leading expression.
See Beloit, supra note 33 at 294. Consideration of the consequence of this conceptual
difference is beyond the scope of this article and is likely rendered moot, given the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Apotex (2008), supra note 15.
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findings of fact during the course of the obviousness analysis. Some findings
of fact, the so-called "secondary considerations," are not strictly required, but
have been recognized as potentially relevant to the obviousness inquiry in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The "commercial success" of
the invention usually garners the most attention. If an invention can be shown
to be commercially successful, courts sometimes appear more comfortable with
finding an invention truly inventive.62 However, courts can also be persuaded
that any such success is just as attributable to sophisticated marketing and other
business strategies.6" Other secondary factors include long felt need,"4 acceptance
by the relevant community and/or awards,65 and the failure of others.66 While,
in some cases, secondary factors have been elevated to the status of "objective
criteria, '67 they usually do not play a determinative role in the decision.6"
Conversely, findings of fact about PHOSITA's knowledge, skill, et cetera,
should, under the Beloit test, effectively answer the question of whether an inven-
tion is obvious or not in most cases. Yet, while the Court of Appeal's characteri-
zations of PHOSITA in Novopharm and Apotex were critical, neither outcome
was rooted in factual findings purely about who the PHOSITA was, what he or
she knew, or what he or she could perform. On the contrary, PHOSITA was, in
each case, characterized relative to the inventor named on the patent in dispute.
As the starting point for the overarching problem framed and studied in
this article, this observation merits careful explanation. In Novopharm, Justice
Shadow described Dr. Hayakawa as "not only a person skilled in the art, but a
person who is an acknowledged inventor."69 Convinced of his inventive ability,
62. See Uhlemann Optical, supra note 37 at 33; Diversified Products Corp. v. Tye-Sil Corp.
(1991), 35 C.P.R. (3d) 350 at 368 (F.C.A.) [Diversified Products].
63. See e.g. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Cobra Fixations Cie/Cobra Anchors Co. (2002), 20 C.P.R.
(4th) 402 at para. 126 (F.C.T.D.) [Illinois Tool].
64. See e.g. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (2007), 58 C.P.R. (4th) 353 at para. 356 (F.C.)
[Eli Lilly].
65. Novopharm (2007), supra note 17 at para. 25.
66. Certain Teed Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2006), 50 C.P.R. (4th) 177 at para. 43
(F.C.) [Certain Teed].
67. AlmeconlndustriesLtd v. Nutron Manufacturing Ltd. (1996), 65 C.P.R. (3d) 417 (F.C.T.D.);
Bourgault Industries Ltd. v. Flexi-CoilLtd. (1998), 80 C.P.R. (3d) 1 at para. 63 (F.C.T.D.).
68. Rather, they are most often cited to buttress a conclusion of non-obviousness.
69. Novopharm (2007), supra note 17 at para. 35.
710 (2009) 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the court found that the "evidence discloses no sound basis for concluding that
a person of ordinary skill in the art with knowledge of the 1985 Gerster
poster"-the key piece of "prior art" that Dr. Hayakawa himself once attended
a presentation of, before filing an application for the patent under dispute-
"would have made the same connections as Dr. Hayakawa." ° Thus, the inven-
tion was found to be non-obvious.7 In essence, then, Justice Sharlow effectively
conducted the inquiry in reverse by concluding that PHOSITA-whomever he
or she may have been-would have lacked the ability to make the same infer-
ences as Dr. Hayakawa. The Court of Appeal did not say who PHOSITA was,
but rather who PHOSITA was not-that is, the court engaged in what we
might call "negative characterization."
In contrast, the Federal Court of Appeal (and the Federal Court below) in
Apotex clearly struggled with the task of determining the obviousness of an inven-
tion from the perspective of an ordinary-skilled person, given that the evidence
at its disposal primarily spoke to the knowledge, skills, and challenges endured
by the inventor himself, Mr. Badorc. Despite Justice Nodl's words to the con-
trary,72 the recital of the lower court's findings of fact as to what PHOSITA
would have known, while in the same breath, highlighting Mr. Badorc's evi-
dence as to the technical difficulties of identifying the drug in question, 73 inevi-
tably conflates the distinction between the two. Mr. Badorc essentially supplied
the perspective of both PHOSITA and patentee: he was "possessed of the charac-
teristics" of a person skilled in the art, but, at the same time, displayed "intuitive
abilities."" In Apotex, then, PHOSITA would appear more real compared to
Novopharm, but still secondary to the evidence of the inventor or expert.
70. Ibid. at para. 36.
71. It is interesting to speculate about what the basis for the distinction between Dr. Hayakawa
and PHOSITA was. Relying on the subject invention as proof of Dr. Hayakawa's
inventiveness would be tautological, given that the obviousness of that very invention was at
issue. Alternatively, assuming that he, as the author of other patented inventions, was more
likely to possess or exhibit the requisite inventiveness would appear to.support a double
standard. Could the burden upon non-established inventors (defined as those who do not
hold other patents) in terms of showing that their inventions would not have occurred to
PHOSITA be higher relative to established inventors such as Dr. Hayakawa? This question is
beyond the scope of this article.
72. See Apotex (2006), supra note 20 at para. 35.
73. Ibid. at paras. 36, 42.
74. Ibid. at paras. 35-36.
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To the extent that courts do consult PHOSITA's perspective, whether
through negative characterization or otherwise, commentators also charge that
they do so only for the limited purposes of assessing what prior art references
would reveal to a suitably trained reader.75 Novopharm is illustrative: Justice
Sharlow keyed upon what the Gerster poster would have conveyed (albeit to
Dr. Hayakawa, as opposed to PHOSITA) without also determining what
PHOSITA would have come to know through his or her cumulative experience."m
However, while prior art is an important source of information about what
PHOSITA would have known at the relevant time, it is not the sole source. De-
pending on the technological field or type of industry, PHOSITA may owe much
of his or her capacities to his or her "tacit knowledge" 77-that is, knowledge or
know-how possessed by individuals, acquired over time and through experience,
and not already disclosed in printed publications, patent applications, or other
forms of prior art theoretically discoverable to PHOSITA. Focusing predomi-
nantly, if not exclusively, on what prior art would have been known to PHO-
SITA, and how PHOSITA would have interpreted it or put it to use, potentially
omits a sizeable portion of PHOSITA's corpus of knowledge and skills.
The next Part sets out the methodologies used to investigate whether the
shortcomings observed in Novopharm and Apotex represent aberrations within
Canadian patent jurisprudence or are, instead, commonplace.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, a few scholars began to analyze the law
in a quantitative fashion using a social science methodology known as "content
analysis." To perform content analysis, "a scholar collects a set of documents,
such as judicial opinions on a particular subject, and systematically reads them,
recording consistent features of each and drawing inferences about their use and
meaning."
78
75. See e.g. Eisenberg, supra note 9.
76. As explained below, however, both inquiries are required under the PatentAct. See Patent
Act, supra note 31, s. 28.3.
77. Michael Polanyi was the first to identify and discuss the importance of tacit knowledge. See
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).
78. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, "Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions"
(2008) 96 Cal. L. Rev. 63 at 64.
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Although content analysis has significant value as a way of "generating ob-
jective, falsifiable, and reproducible knowledge about what courts do and how
and why they do it,"" this methodology also has clear limitations. Content
analysis trades quality for quantity. Coding cases for the presence or absence of
pre-selected facts or factors cannot, for example, capture the strength of a par-
ticular judge's rhetoric nor a variety of other nuances in legal reasoning that
inform the legal community's sense of what precedential value to assign to a
judicial decision.
There is also a deeper problem with this methodology: using content analysis
to predict judicial outcomes is at serious risk of being tautological, as the facts
or factors courts choose to rely upon may only reflect, rather than generate, the
legal result in question. Certain facts may also form part of the overall record
for the proceeding (through viva voce testimony, affidavit evidence, et cetera),
but be omitted from the final decision.
However, when what is being sought after is a sense of the facts or factors
courts choose to give explicit focus to-rather than an assessment of how those
variables might predict specific legal outcomes-content analysis can serve as a
valuable complement to more interpretive modes of legal analysis.8" Although
examining the entire record for every proceeding would be ideal,8 a content
analysis of judicial decisions alone can help us to discover previously unnoticed
patterns in the jurisprudence, setting the stage for deeper inquiries.
That is the intended pairing here. Content analysis is used to describe, in
empirical terms, how Canadian courts apply the non-obviousness requirement-
and, more specifically, to examine the extent to which they characterize PHO-
SITA during- the inquiry while "controlling for" (that is, recording) a host of
other variables that may or may not prove relevant.8 2 Against this body of data,
a deeper critique of the jurisprudence is then developed, incorporating insights
from intellectual property-related literatures in the fields of sociology, manage-
ment, and economics. Details about the specific population of cases under
79. Ibid. at 64.
80. Ibid. at 66.
81. For practical reasons, such a comprehensive review of the cases included in this content
analysis was not performed.
82. Given the centrality of PHOSITA to the question of obviousness, it was assumed that the
court should include any and all findings of fact made related to PHOSITA in the body of a
decision.
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scrutiny and the coding system that was developed to carry out the analysis are
described next.
A. THE POPULATION
Findings of fact (or the absence thereof) made in connection with the obvious-
ness inquiry are the primary focus here. Thus, only decisions at the trial level
were included in the content analysis. For practical reasons, the pool was fur-
ther limited to decisions issued by the Federal Court, where the majority of
patent disputes are litigated in Canada. "3 Since Beloit was assumed to be the
leading statement of the non-obviousness test, the pool was also limited to
those decisions where the Federal Court of Appeal's decision is referenced. A
search of the QuickLaw database, limited to Federal Court decisions with the
terms "patent" and "obvious"" appearing in the headnote, as well as the term
"Beloit" anywhere in the text, returned eighty decisions.8"
B. DATA COLLECTION
A coding system for recording twenty variables was developed to perform the
content analysis on the case population (see Table 2). Proponents of content
analysis caution that it is better to code for as many different variables as possible,
even though certain variables may not appear relevant to the specific inquiry.
Perhaps the way in which the non-obviousness test is applied will vary depend-
ing on the technological field of the alleged invention, the nature of the pro-
ceeding, how the question of obviousness is framed, whether novelty is also at
issue, or the number of prior art references tendered as evidence before the
court. As a result, for each decision in the pool, a number of general features
were recorded, including: the technological field of the invention; the type of
proceeding (either a summary proceeding under the PMNOC Regulations or an
ordinary action for patent infringement);86 whether obviousness is framed as a
83. Decisions by other Canadian courts have had an impact upon the direction of Canadian
patent law. While those decisions were not included in the content analysis, they were
incorporated into the doctrinal analysis. See Part IV, below.
84. The search was conducted so as to capture any decisions where the word "obvious" appeared,
whether as a whole word or as the root of other words.
85. This search was conducted in August 2007.
86. Proceedings under the PMNOC Regulations, supra note 15, are intended to be summary in
nature, and the patent-holder is entitled to bring a separate action for patent infringement.
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question of fact, mixed fact and law, or pure law; whether anticipation was pled
and found; and the total number of prior art references recorded.
A second cluster of variables focuses on how the obviousness analysis was
executed. With the exception of whether or not PHOSITA is deployed for the
purpose of patent claim construction,8 7 these "analytic variables" flow from the
foregoing primer regarding the non-obviousness doctrine and the Federal Court
of Appeal's decisions in Novopharm and Apotex. They are intended to capture
whether PHOSITA is used to interpret the prior art, the extent to which PHO-
SITA is characterized, and the role of secondary considerations. However, the
actual coding system corresponding to each of these variables requires further
explanation.
Two variables concern whether PHOSITA is used to interpret the prior art
or, alternatively, whether the court relies solely upon expert evidence for that
task. Each variable is coded in a binary fashion. The court must do more than
simply quote from Beloit or some other authority stating that the prior art should
be interpreted through PHOSITA's eyes in order to be coded as a "1." For ex-
ample, the court must explicitly choose between two competing interpretations
of a particular prior art reference, based on what the court deems PHOSITA to
know or not know. Without such a meaningful use of PHOSITA in interpreting
the prior art, the decision is coded as a "0" for this variable. On the other hand,
if the court fails to utilize PHOSITA for this purpose, and also selects an expert's
interpretation of the prior art without explicitly acknowledging that PHOSITA
is the proper lens through. which such interpretation is to be performed, the
decision is then coded as a "1" under this second prior art-related variable.
The next set of variables attempts to track whether courts make specific
findings of fact about PHOSITA. Whether a court specifies that PHOSITA
would have a Ph.D. degree in biochemistry versus several years of post-secondary
education should not, in principle, pre-determine the question of obviousness.
Rather, what is important is that the court turns its mind to meaningfully assess
This is precisely what occurred in Novopharm. Prior to the decision by the Federal Court of
Appeal, Mosley J., in the context of an application pursuant to the PMNOC Regulations,
found the patent invalid due to obviousness. SeeJanssen-Ortho Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.
(2004), 35 C.P.R. (4th) 353 (F.C.) [Janssen-OrthoI. With the benefit of what he described as
more "extensive evidence," Hughes J. later arrived at the opposite conclusion. SeeJanssen-
Ortho Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd. (2006), 57 C.P.R. (4th) 6 (F.C.) [Novopharm (2006)], affd
Novopharm (2007), supra note 17.
87. The reason for coding for this variable will become apparent in the analysis below.
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what PHOSITA would know and be able to accomplish; the presence or absence
of certain specific findings of fact may be indicators of the same. Thus, to regis-
ter as a "1" under level of education, it was sufficient, but not necessary, for the
court to specify a particular degree. The court could simply make some generic
statement about PHOSITA being "highly educated"; otherwise the decision
would be coded as a "0" for this variable. Similarly, noting that PHOSITA had
several years of post-graduate training would earn a "1" under level of experience.
Coding for whether the court acknowledged the existence of PHOSITA's
tacit knowledge was particularly challenging. Any explicit acknowledgment of
PHOSITA's "tacit knowledge," "know-how," or "experiential knowledge"-
terms that are sometimes used interchangeably in other disciplines-would
garner a "1." However, the decision was made to code discussion about whether
PHOSITA would have to engage in experimentation or testing in order to know
something as a "0," unless the court talked about PHOSITA's pre-existing store
of knowledge and skill acquired through such experimentation or testing. This
distinction is perhaps too fine-but, as explained below, the issue, as the courts
saw it, usually reduced to whether PHOSITA could even engage in experimen-
tation, quite apart from what level of tacit knowledge PHOSITA possessed, past
or present.
The fourth characterization variable was intended as a catch-all. If a court
qualified PHOSITA in any other way-for instance, by acknowledging that
PHOSITA was a composite of individuals and skill sets, that PHOSITA was able
to synthesize multiple prior art references, or that PHOSITA exhibited a par-
ticular tendency to publish his/her work-then this variable was scored as a "1."
To help ensure reliability, the coding criterion for negative characterization
was intentionally narrow. Cases were read with a view to finding statements
similar to those espoused by Justice Sharlow in Novopharm (2007)-in other
words, where the court explicitly assigns PHOSITA with a status inferior to the
alleged inventor.
The next grouping of variables comprises factors considered relevant, but
secondary to an invention's obviousness. Coding was straightforward, save for
the fact that if a court found commercial success (or some other secondary fac-
tor), but questioned its significance to obviousness based on the facts, then the
decision received a "0."
The final two variables are not specifically concerned with analysis execution.
The penultimate variable aims to provide insight into the role of innovation.
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TABLE 2: CONTENT ANALYSIS - VARIABLES AND CODING SYSTEM
Variable Coding System
The number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 was assigned
depending on whether the putative invention belonged
Technological Field to the agricultural, electrical, pharmaceutical,
biomedical, computer-related, general, chemical, or
oil/mining-related fields, respectively.
Whether PMNOC Case 0 - No; 1 - Yes
0 - If the issue of non-obviousness was not framed at
all; I - If the issue of non-obviousness was framed as a
Question Frame question of fact; 2 - If the issue of non-obviousness was
framed as a mixed question of law and fact; 3 - If the
issue of non-obviousness was framed as a question of
law
Anticipation at Issue 0 - No; 1 - Yes
When possible, the actual number of prior art
No. of Prior Art References references cited by the court was noted. (In some
decisions the court did not state the precise number.)
Claims Construed Using PHOSITA 0- No; I - Yes
Prior Art Interpreted through PHOSITA 0- No; I -Yes
Prior Art Interpreted through Experts Only 0 - No; I -Yes
PHOSITA's Level of Education* 0- No; I - Yes
PHOSITA's Level of Experience* 0 - No; I - Yes
Reference to PHOSITA's Tacit Knowledge* 0- No; I - Yes
Any Other Reference to PHOSITA's Identity, 0 - No; I - Yes
Knowledge, or Skill'
Negative Characterization 0 -No; I -Yes
Positive Finding of Commercial Success- 0- No; I - Yes
Postiive Finding of Long Felt Need** 0 - No; I - Yes
Positive Finding of Failure by Others" 0 - No; I - Yes
Positive Finding of Community Acceptance or 0 - No; I - Yes
Awards-
Any Reference to the Public Domain or the 0 - No; I -Yes
"Commons"
Patent Found Invalid for Obviousness 0 - No; I - Yes
These four variables were added together to generate a 'Total Characterization Score" (between 0 and 4) for each
decision. Note that the 'negative characterization' variable was excluded from this score.
** These four variables were added together to generate a "Total Secondary Factor Score" (between 0 and 4) for each
decision.
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theory in the jurisprudence by attempting to capture whether courts are cogni-
zant of the interface between the proprietary and the non-proprietary realms-
an interface which, as explained in Part V below, is critically important for sci-
entific innovation. Decisions where the court made mention of the "public do-
main" or "the commons," potentially signalling a basic awareness that knowledge
that is not patented has some role to play in the innovation process, were coded




Fifty-two Federal Court decisions from the total population of eighty were
coded.88 Although there were more cases (twenty-three) involving pharmaceuti-
cal inventions than inventions from other technological fields, the population
was relatively diverse.89 Other general features of these decisions are summarized
in Table 3. Anticipation was often alleged in tandem with obviousness, but with
less success.9 Two other general findings are noteworthy insofar as they appear
inconsistent with the caselaw. First, only eight of the decisions explicitly framed
obviousness as a factual inquiry.91 Courts instead typically quoted the Beloit test
88. This group was assumed to be representative of the total pool. The cases were coded in two
passes. First, every third case (in chronological order) was coded; then, every second case was
coded.
89. The remaining 29 cases included agricultural (3), electrical (2), biotechnological (1),
mechanical (18), chemical (4), and mining (1) inventions.
90. This contrasts slightly with the findings of Allison & Lemley, supra note 6. They found that
patented inventions were found invalid due to anticipation in 37 out of 91 decisions (40.7
per cent), whereas allegations of obviousness were more common but less successful (58 out
of 160 decisions, or 36.3 per cent). The decisions where anticipation was found are: Beloit
Canada Ltd. et al, v. Valmet Oy (1984), 78 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.T.D.);JM. Voith GmbH v.
Beloit Corp. (1989), 27 C.P.R. (3d) 289 (F.C.T.D.) [f.M Voith]; SmithKline Beecham
Pharma Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (2001), 14 C.P.R. (4th) 76 (F.C.T.D.) [SmithKline Beecham];
Novartis AG v. Apotex Inc. (2001), 15 C.P.R. (4th) 417 (F.C.T.D.) [Novartis]; Abbott
Laboratories v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2005), 42 C.P.R. (4th) 121 (F.C.); Abbott
Laboratories v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2007), 54 C.P.R. (4th) 356 (F.C.) [Abbott]; and
AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Inc. (2007), 60 C.P.R. (4th) 199 (F.C.) [AstraZeneca].
91. The eight decisions were: Computalog Ltd. v. Comtecb Logging Ltd. (1990), 32 C.P.R. (3d)
289 (F.C.T.D.); Martinray Industries Ltd. v. Fabricants Naiional Dagendor Manufacturing
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(which does not, strictly speaking, name the factual nature of the inquiry) and
proceeded to evaluate the expert evidence. Second, in less than half of the deci-
sions was PHOSITA meaningfully used in the exercise of claim construction,
despite the Supreme Court of Canada's clear direction to do so in Free World
Trust and Whirlpool. 2
It is difficult to determine whether these findings reflect actual errors in ju-
dicial reasoning or are instead a by-product of content analysis methodology (or
the specific coding system employed here). Weighing the opinions of experts is
intrinsic to the trier of fact. Perhaps it does not matter that the Federal Court is
not in the habit of naming obviousness as a question of fact, despite the impor-
tance placed upon doing so in other contexts93 and because, unlike in the United
States, there are no contrasting authorities.9"
That PHOSITA was seemingly seldom used in claim construction may
also be misleading. Courts frequently, if not always, identified the ordinary
skilled person as the individual to whom the patent claims were addressed. The
Ltd. (1991), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (F.C.T.D.); CFM Inc. v. Wolf Steel Ltd. (1993), 50 C.P.R.
(3d) 215 (F.C.T.D.) [Wolf Steel]; Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. (1998), 79 C.P.R.
(3d) 193 (F.C.T.D.) [Wellcome Foundation]; AB Hassle v. Apotex Inc. (2003), 27 C.P.R.
(4th) 465 (F.C.T.D.) [AB Hassle]; Certain Teed, supra note 66; Novopharm (2006), supra
note 86; and AstraZeneca, ibid.
92. The twenty-one decisions were: Reading and Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources
Corp. (1986), 13 C.P.R. (3d) 410 (F.C.T.D.); Diversified Products Corp. v. Tye-Sil Corp. Ltd.
(1987), 16 C.P.R. (3d) 207; JM. Voith, supra note 90; WolfSteel, ibid.; Anderson v. Machineries
Yvon Beaudoin Inc. (1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 449 (F.C.T.D.); Almecon Industries Ltd. v.
Nutron Manufacturing Ltd. (1996), 65 C.P.R. (3d) 417 (F.C.T. .); Apotex Inc. v. Syntex
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd. (1999), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 22 (F.C.T.D.); Novartis, supra note
90; Illinois Tool. supra note 63; Westaim Corp. v. Royal Canadian Mint (2002), 23 C.P.R.
(4th) 9 (F.C.T.D.); GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Genpharm Inc. (2003), 30 C.P.R. (4th) 360
(F.C.); Halfbrd v. Seed Hawk Inc. (2004), 31 C.P.R. (4th) 434 (F.C.); Janssen-Ortho, supra
note 86; Abbott, supra note 90; Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd. (2005), 42 C.P.R.
(4th) 502 (F.C.); Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (2005), 43 C.P.R. (4th) 81 (F.C.); Aventis
Pharma Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (2005), 44 C.P.R. (4th) 108 (F.C.); Abbott Laboratories v. Canada
(Minister ofHealth) (2006), 46 C.P.R. (4th) 324 (F.C.); Dimplex North America Ltd. v. CFM
Corp. (2006), 54 C.P.R. (4th) 435 (F.C.); Novopharm (2006), ibid.; and AstraZeneca, ibid.
93. In the administrative law context, for instance, the nature of the question has long been an
important consideration (albeit not a determinative one) in arriving at the applicable standard
of review. This remains the case, notwithstanding the recent reformulation of what the different
possible standards are. See Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para. 53.
94. Prior to KSR, supra note 10, the Federal Circuit had, on occasion, framed obviousness as a
question of law.
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TABLE 3: GENERAL FEATURES
Variable Coding System
Question Frame Only 8/52 cases (-15%) explicitly framed obviousness
as a factual inquiry.
In 73.08% of the cases (38/52) anticipation was alsoAnticipation at Issuerasd
raised.
Anticipation Found Anticipation was found in 7/38 (-18%) cases in which
it was plead.
Claims Construed Using PHOSITA In 21/52 cases (-40%) PHOSITA was used for claim
construction.
Prior Art Interpreted through PHOSITA PHOSITA was meaningfully used to interpret the prior
art in 32/52 (-62%) cases.
The prior art was interpreted through experts only in
Prior Art Interpreted through Experts Only 11/52 (-21%) decisions.
Any Reference to the "Public Domain" or the "Commons" In 7/52 (- 13%) cases the term 'public domain' appeared.
Patent Found Invalid for Obviousness The patents in question were found invalid due to
obviousness in 13/52 (25%) decisions.
skilled person was simply not invoked when choosing one party's offered inter-
pretation of the claims over the other. Rather, the court frequently said that it
found one expert's view more credible than the other, at times for reasons wholly
unrelated to the technological field and claims.9" Under the coding system em-
ployed here, that does not register as using PHOSITA in claims construction.
References to the "public domain" were made in seven decisions."' This, too,
reveals a limitation of coding cases. The term was intended to identify passages
where the court grapples with the interplay between the proprietary and non-
proprietary in terms of its importance for scientific innovation. However, in none
of the seven cases where the term "public domain" appeared was that interplay
discussed. Courts were instead dealing with the issue of whether a particular
95. Courts often opted for one expert over the other because they found the other expert to be
biased or less credible.
96. The term "commons" did not appear in any decision. For the seven decisions in which the
phrase "public domain" occurred, seejM Voith, supra note 90; Risi Stone Ltd. v. Groupe
Permacon Inc. (1995), 65 C.P.R. (3d) 2 (F.C.T.D.); Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc. (1997),
76 C.P.R. (3d) 150 (F.C.T.D.); GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2003),
28 C.P.R. (4th) 307 (F.C.);Janssen-Ortho, supra note 86; Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada
(Minister of Health) (2005), 43 C.P.R. (4th) 241 (F.C.); and Eli Lilly, supra note 64.
720 (2009147 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
TABLE 4: PHOSITA CHARACTERIZATION
Variable Coding System
PHOSITA's Level of Education Only 11/52 (-21%) cases pecified anything about
PHOSITA's level of education.
Only 12/52 (-23%) cases gave some indication about
PHOSITA's Level of Experience PHOSITA's level of experience in the technological
field in question.
In zero decisions was any specific finding made about
Reference to PHOSITA's Tacit Knowledge PHOSITA being able to rely on any particular .form of
'tacit knowledge.'
Any Other Reference to PHOSITA's Identity, In 19/52 (-37%) cases, the court made some other
Knowledge or Skill remark that characterized PHOSITA.
Negative Characterization In 5/52 (-10%) decisions, the court explicitly engaged
in Novopharm-like negative characterization.
publication or invention formed part of the public domain and thus counted
against the patent in question as prior art.
B. PHOSITA CHARACTERIZATION
Findings for each of the individual characterization variables are presented in
Table 4, above. Strikingly, when the first four of these five variables are added
and averaged across all decisions, the mean Total Characterization Score is 0.81.
In numerical terms, the Federal Court averaged less than one specific finding of
fact about who PHOSITA is, what he or she is capable of, et cetera. On the other
hand, coding also reveals that negative characterization in the form witnessed in
Novopharm is rare.9"
It is also worth noting that in the process of coding the cases for variables
related to PHOSITA's characterization, no instances were found where the
court referred to some form of empirical or sociological evidence (e.g., surveys)
tendered by counsel to show whether a particular invention would or would not
have been obvious to PHOSITA.
97. Negative characterization was found in the following five decisions: Mahurkar v. Vas-Cath of
Canada Ltd. (1988), 18 C.P.R. (3d) 417 at 435-36 (F.C.T.D.) [Mahurkar]; Control Data
Canada Ltd. v. Senstar Corp. (1989), 23 C.P.R. (3d) 449 (F.C.T.D.) [ControlData]; Stiga
Aktiebolag v. S.L.M. Canada Inc. (1990), 34 C.P.R. (3d) 216 (F.C.T.D.) [StigaAktiebolag];Wolf
Steel, supra note 91; 671905Alberta Inc. v. QMax Solutions Inc. (2001), 14 C.P.R. (4th) 129
(F.C.T.D.).
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TABLE 5: SECONDARY FACTORS
Variable Coding System
Positive Finding of Commercial Success Courts made a positive finding of commercial success
in 19/52 (-37%) decisions.
Positive Finding of Long Felt Need Courts made a positive finding of long felt need/want
in 5/52 (-10%) decisions.
Positive Finding of Failure by Others Courts made a positive finding of failure of others in
11/52 (-21%) decisions.
Positive Finding of Community Acceptance or Awards Courts made a positive finding of acceptance by others
I / meritorious awards in 13/52 (25%) decisions.
C. SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS
Secondary factor data are provided in Table 5. Similar to the analogous charac-
terization figure, the mean Total Secondary Factor Score was less than one (0.65).
As with several other variables, the jurisprudence highlighted the limits of the
process of coding secondary factors. For example, while only eleven decisions
noted the failure of others in order to buttress a conclusion of non-obviousness,
another oft-quoted passage from Beloit surrounding hindsight bias arguably
amounts to the same finding.98
D. STATISTICAL TESTS
Statistical tests were performed with the aid of computer software, despite the
questionable value of such tests.99 Briefly, there was some statistical support for
the notion that the extent to which PHOSITA is characterized impacts other
elements of the court's analysis. There was, for example, a statistically signifi-
cant positive correlation between the Total Characterization Score in each case
and the use of PHOSITA for claim construction."'0 The greater the degree of
98. See Parts IV(C)(1)-(2), below.
99. These statistical tests were of questionable value because of the small population size. Once
armed with the coding data, however, it was impossible to resist performing these tests (using
SPSS software).
100. Statistical significance is a function of probability (orp). When the probability that a correlation
exists between two variables exceeds the 95 per cent confidence interval (i.e. p < 0.05), the
correlation is considered statistically significant. In this case, the correlation between the
Total Characterization Score and the use of PHOSITA during claim construction surpassed
that threshold (p = 0.035).
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characterization, in other words, the more likely we would see PHOSITA being
used in claim construction. There was likewise a statistically significant positive
correlation between the Total Characterization Score and the use of PHOSITA
to interpret the prior art."' The greater the Total Characterization Score, the
more likely it was that PHOSITA was used to interpret prior art.
To reiterate, assessing whether PHOSITA characterization was a reliable
predictor of obviousness outcomes was not the object of this content analysis.
As expected, no statistical support for the notion that characterization impacts
obviousness outcomes was found." 2
IV. BEYOND NUMBERS: A DEEPER CRITIQUE
Content analysis is useful here insofar as it clearly documents the lack of findings
of fact made by the Federal Court in performing the non-obviousness inquiry.
This Part embarks on a deeper critique of the jurisprudence-probing what the
foregoing data-driven exercise only scratches at the surface of, or perhaps misses
entirely. The argument that is developed in detail in this Part is essentially as
follows: PHOSITA's capacities have been interpreted by the courts in ways that
may depart from the notion of a skilled, albeit ordinary, technician. More wor-
risome, though, are the rulings that tend to nullify the need for specific findings
of fact about at least two of PHOSITA's capacities. In lieu of contextually char-
acterizing PHOSITA, courts engage in negative characterization (whether in its
explicit Novopharm-esque form or in the sort of subtler "characterization con-
flations" witnessed in Apotex), invoke a concern over hindsight bias, or do both.
Both phenomena should be of significant concern.
A. PHOSITA PHRENOLOGY
The essence of PHOSITA is ordinariness within his or her particular domain of
science or art. The point at which the capacity to invent begins is, theoretically,
where PHOSITA's ordinary capacities end. A closer examination of the jurispru-
101. This correlation was very significant, statistically speaking (p < 0.005 (0.003)).
102. The correlation between the Total Characterization Score and whether the patented invention
was found to be obvious was not significant, and this remained true when the type of
invention and nature of the proceeding were controlled for (technological field, PMNOC
versus non-PMNOC, et cetera). Further, regression analysis did not reveal that any of the
characterization variables were significant predictors of obviousness outcomes.
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dence reveals that the (hemi)sphere of inventiveness may encroach upon several
capacities that would otherwise appear quite ordinary in the plain language sense
of the term, if not also in Justice Hugessen's accepted depiction of PHOSITA
in Beloit. But focusing on what is inside and outside the realm of the scientifically
ordinary, as a purely conceptual matter, would seem nearly as intractable as
answering what is obvious in the abstract. On the other hand, interpreting a
particular capacity so as to render findings of fact unnecessary for the case at bar
should attract increased scrutiny. Consider four capacities in turn.
1. CAPACITY ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW
The Supreme Court of Canada has noted, on repeated occasion, that PHOSITA
evolves and grows in parallel with the state of the art.1"3 This would appear to
imply that PHOSITA is more than capable of keeping apprised of published
developments in his or her field. On the other hand, the Federal Court has often
been persuaded that, in the absence of objective proof that PHOSITA would
have been aware of a particular piece of prior art, there is no reason to assume
the same. In Mahurkar,°h for instance, Justice Strayer (as he then was) stated:
[A]n objective test should be applied to determine whether [PHOSITA] could be
reasonably assumed to have knowledge of such prior art. ... No evidence was pro-
duced by the defendants to show that [PHOSITA] should be assumed to have been
aware of all of this prior art. Frankly, I find it difficult to believe... 10
This proposition was cited with approval by Justice Hansen in Westaim Corp.
v. Royal Canadian Mint,"6 amongst several other decisions. We can debate as to
whether the opposite presumption would be more in keeping with the Supreme
Court's rulings. However, the more important point is that PHOSITA's capacity
for literature review is to be determined in each case according to what the
ordinary scientist conducting research in the real world would be able to find. In
bridging this divide between PHOSITA and the real world, PHOSITA's capacity
for literature review stands in absolute contrast to the United States where, even
post-KSR, PHOSITA is presumed to be "perfectly informed" of all the prior art.107
103. See e.g. Whirlpool, supra note 59 at para. 74.
104. Supra note 97, aff'd 32 C.P.R. (3d) 409 (F.C.A.).
105. Ibid. at 435-36.
106. Supra note 92 at para. 114.
107. See Daralyn Durie & Mark Lemley, "A Realist Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions"
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2. CAPACITY TWO: SYNTHESIZING INFORMATION AND DRAWING
INFERENCES
Assuming that a reasonably diligent review would produce multiple pieces of
prior art, the next logical question concerns what PHOSITA would be able to
decipher from that body of information. Because obviousness, unlike anticipa-
tion, can be shown through a "mosaic" of prior art,108 some capacity to synthe-
size information from multiple sources and potentially apply it in executing the
tasks of an ordinary practitioner seems to be implied. Justice Hugessen's depic-
tion of PHOSITA as a "paragon of deduction" is also consistent with this." 9
However, in several instances, the court seems sceptical of PHOSITA's abil-
ity to make inferences. For example, in Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.,11
Justice. Blanchard concluded that, while certain general principles of chemistry
were well-known to PHOSITA, such principles would not have been sufficient
to deduce that the compound at issue, in a particular dosage form, would be
less likely to cause adverse reactions to food."' Yet such a determination is diffi-
cult to impugn, provided it is rooted in the evidence as to what those general
principles were and whether an ordinary scientist could have drawn the neces-
sary inferences to arrive at the invention in question. If, on the other hand, Jus-
tice Blanchard had articulated a blanket rule as to what PHOSITA's inferential
reasoning ability should be, then the ruling would have been problematic, tip-
ping the balance in favour of fiction over fact.
3. CAPACITY THREE: COMMON SENSE
The first two of PHOSITA's capacities were tethered closely to the prior art.
But as the distance between his or her capacities and the prior art increases, or
the link disappears entirely, courts appear less comfortable (or more willing
to rely upon attribute abstractions than factual findings). For example, in the
entire pool of decisions, only one case explicitly acknowledged PHOSITA's
(Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No.
1133169, 2008) at 27, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1133169>, citing Michael Ebert,
"Superperson and the Prior Art" (1985) 67 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 657.
108. See e.g. AB Hassle, supra note 91.
109. Beloit, supra note 33 at 294.
110. Supra note 92.
111. Ibid. at paras. 118-19.
HERDER, DEMYTHOLOGIZING PHOSITA 725
common sense.1 1 2 One can wonder about what "common sense" even means.
Again, though, the more important point is to not inculcate the analysis with
rigid rules and, instead, expect the court to make findings of fact of about what
common sense, if any, a given PHOSITA would have.
Recent experience in the United States illustrates this beautifully. In KSR,
the Federal Circuit had determined that the putative invention-an adjustable
electronic sensor accelerator pedal-was non-obvious, notwithstanding that
both adjustable accelerator pedals and electronic sensors on (non-adjustable)
accelerator pedals were known in the prior art. The Federal Circuit said this was
so because there was no "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine those
two technologies in the prior art. Conversely, the US Supreme Court held that
no such teaching, suggestion, or motivation was needed: "Common sense teaches
... that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes,
and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.""' 3
In Canada, no parallel "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test exists."
4
Nevertheless, integrating common sense into the Canadian PHOSITA lexicon
would be helpful, if only to stress that the court's fundamental task is to deter-
mine whether someone of ordinary skill and knowledge would have been led to
the particular invention in dispute, regardless of whether it was on the strength
of his or her knowledge of the prior art, common sense, or both.
4. CAPACITY FOUR: TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIMENTATION
Common sense is supposedly a product of one's lived experience. Knowledge
that may not be at all common, but is still the result of one's lived experience, is
often referred to as one's tacit knowledge or know-how. This capacity, too, is,
by definition, detached from the prior art: tacit knowledge is knowledge that is
not codified or written down."' While the court has, on occasion, recognized
112. AstraZeneca, supra note 90 at para. 30.
113. KSR, supra note 10 at 1743-44.
114. Novopharm (2006), supra note 86 at para. 113. It is not at all clear that the way Hughes J.
described the motivation factor is equivalent to motivation under the American TSM test.
Whereas Hughes J. focuses upon the motivation of the inventor, the TSM test contemplates
whether PHOSITA would have been motivated to combine information in the prior art.
115. Polanyi, supra note 77.
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that "[n]ot all knowledge is found in print form,"'1 6 there were zero decisions in
which PHOSITA's tacit knowledge or experiential know-how was highlighted
as having a meaningful role in the case.
We should be cautious in equating this empirical finding with an absolute
rejection of the very idea of PHOSITA possessing tacit knowledge. Perhaps a
better window into the court's general position regarding tacit knowledge is
the body of decisions where PHOSITA's ability to engage in experimentation
is at issue-that is precisely when PHOSITA's cumulative tacit knowledge
would be most relevant. There are two lines of decisions within this body of
caselaw.117 In one, "routine testing" and "simple" or "mere verification" are well
within the scope of permissible activity. Justice Wetston stated in Wellcome
Foundation118 that:
There is no inventiveness in following an obvious and well-charted route using
known techniques and processes involving known compositions unless the inventor
encounters difficulties that could not have been reasonably exPected by a person
versed in the art or overcome by the application of ordinary skill. 19
In an exceptionally well-reasoned ruling, Justice Noel determined that the
inventive spark lay not in the conduct of certain experimental activities carried
out by the patent-holder, but was rather contained in pre-existing published
materials. As such, he declined to hold that the fact of experimentation itself
precludes a finding of obviousness:
The evidence shows that all that what was needed were confirmation results; -the as-
sociation between the use of carvedilol and the prolongation of survival in the treat-
ment of patients with CHF happened in 1979 for Beta-Blockers as a class and in the
late eighties for carvedilol. I find that the final Phase III results are merely there to
eliminate the uncertainty reigning amongst the community of cardiologists and oth-
ers. That element of creativity which is essential to an invention surely cannot be
found in test results. Those results only confirm whether the invention can be used
or not. The spark was in the association of the use of carvedilol for the purpose of
116. Novopharm (2006), supra note 86 at para. 113, aff'd Novopharm (2007), supra note 17.
117. The Federal Court has acknowledged this tension, although it has not sought to resolve it on
at least two occasions. See Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (2002), 22 C.P.R. (4th) 466 at
paras. 102-10 (F.C.T.D.); Abbott Laboratories v. Canada (Minister of Health), supra note 92
at paras. 99-101.
118. Supra note 91, afId (2000), [2001] 1 F.C. 495 (F.C.A.), aff d [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153.
119. Wellcome Foundation, ibid. at 243.
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prolonging survival for CHF. This is the invention and it was in the public domain
prior to [the invention date]. 25
However, these and other similar rulings do not belong to the dominant
line of authority, The dominant view is, instead, that PHOSITA cannot engage
in any experimentation whatsoever regardless of whether it involves known
techniques and substances. Justice Gibson captures this view in SmithKline
Beecham,12 1 wholeheartedly adopting the reasoning of a 1995 decision by the
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division):
122
[A]lthough one would normally imagine that this mythical person's laboratory is filled
with mythical test tubes and Petri dishes and that his or her daily life is spent in ex-
perimentation, for the purposes of this legal exercise, no research of any kind can be
contemplated. So, although it may have been logical to an actual skilled person at the
time, based on the state of the art, to conduct certain testing, that is not open to the
mythical skilled technician. The mythical researcher cannot have an inquiring or
thinking mind which ultimately would lead him or her to the answer but rather he
or she is expected to instantly and spontaneously exclaim, without more, "I already
know the answer and it is obvious." Nor is it appropriate to say that there were sig-
nificant telltales which pointed the way for the mythical expert or that there were
sufficient clues which made the invention "worth a try."
123
Justice Gibson went on to remark that this is why Justice Hugessen stated
that the Beloit test was so difficult to satisfy.' 2' As with PHOSITA's capacity to
synthesize information from multiple sources, however, this would seem to be
at odds with the portion of the test describing PHOSITA as nothing short of a
perfect model of "deduction and dexterity." Indeed, this particular internal ten-
sion has left other members of the Federal Court perplexed, 2 ' or attempting
120. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2004), 129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 181 at para.
66 (F.C.) [GlaxoSmithKline.
121. Supra note 90 at para. 48.
122. BayerAktiengesellschaftv. Apotex Inc. (1995), 60 C.P.R. (3d) 58 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.))
[Bayer], aff'd (1998), 82 C.P.R. (3d) 526 (Ont. C.A.) (cross-appeal by Bayer allowed on an
issue not relevant to the issue of obviousness), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 26979 (1
April 1999).
123. Bayer, ibid. at 80-81.
124. SmithKline Beecham, supra note 90 at para. 48.
125. For example, immediately after quoting from Bayer, supra note 122, Dawson J. re-
emphasized the depiction of PHOSITA as a "paragon of deduction and dexterity." Beloit,
supra note 33. See Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., supra note 117 at para. 110.
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delicately to straddle the two lines of authority.126
Insofar as the Ontario General Division ruling in Bayer remains the domi-
nant line of authority, PHOSITA's absolute inability to engage in experimenta-
tion amounts to a "tacit" rejection of PHOSITA's tacit knowledge. And yet,
social science research overwhelmingly supports the view that tacit knowledge is
generally critical to success in scientific research and firm competitiveness.'
27
True, the degree to which tacit knowledge has not been codified in some form
(either in a publication or a patent's disclosure) may vary substantially according
to the technological field. Vaccine research and development, for example, has
traditionally been said to be complex relative to pharmaceuticals, not because
the requisite information about viruses (i.e., how to manipulate them and pro-
duce vaccines) is unknown or unavailable, but because this process of vaccine
manufacture is very challenging, technically. 128 It requires a considerable degree
of knowledge and skill acquired through experience over time, which cannot be
easily applied after reading a collection of science articles and patents.
From the court's perspective, the challenge is how to operationalize PHO-
SITA's tacit knowledge in order to assess whether the invention in dispute is
beyond PHOSITA's knowledge and other capacities. At a minimum, an aware-
ness of tacit knowledge should underscore the importance of making specific
findings of fact in each case about what PHOSITA knows through both the
prior art as well as lived experience-findings that, according to the content
analysis carried out here, the Federal Court seldom, if ever, makes, and which
126. See e.g. Apotex (2005), supra note 20 at para. 78. Shore J. stated: "The person skilled in
the art must know that the solution or the benefits would be present without testing
(excluding, of course, simple verification of already known information)" [emphasis in
original].
127. See Jamie D. Collins & Michael A. Hitt, "Leveraging Tacit Knowledge in Alliances: The
Importance of Using Relational Capabilities to Build and Leverage Relational Capital"
(2006) 23 J. Eng. Tech. Mgmt. 147; Ajay Agrawal, "Engaging the Inventor: Exploring
Licensing Strategies for University Inventions and the Role of Latent Knowledge" (2006) 27
Strat. Mgmt. J. 63.
128. Historically, dating back to Louis Pasteur's development of a vaccine for anthrax, the real
barrier to those wishing to manufacture vaccines on their own has been the high degree of
technical difficulty. At that time, the laws of France precluded Pasteur from patenting the
vaccine (or the methods he developed to make it). Pasteur thus refused to share the
technical "know-how" needed to make the vaccine with others. See Maurice Cassier,
"Appropriation and Commercial-ization of the Pasteur Anthrax Vaccine" (2005) 36 Stud.
Hist. & Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. 722.
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the Bayer line of authority about PHOSITA's ability to engage in experimenta-
tion appears to directly inhibit.
B. DR. HAYAKAWA AND MR. BADORC REVISITED
Conceptualizing a capacity as fixed (e.g., the inability to engage in experimenta-
tion) pre-empts findings of fact and therefore undermines PHOSITA's role in
the obviousness analysis. Defining PHOSITA relative to others, whether explic-
itly or implicitly-a second trend uncovered in the jurisprudence-produces
the same harm.
Recall that Justice Sharlow's decision in Novopharm was rooted in the clear
distinction she drew between the capacities of PHOSITA and Dr. Hayakawa.129
Based on the content analysis, such explicit negative characterization does not
appear to be a common phenomenon.13 Yet the coding process also uncovered
a stronger tendency."' Instead of fully characterizing PHOSITA in his own
right, or explicitly distinguishing him from the alleged inventor, courts tended
to conflate the two, searching for a "proxy" for PHOSITA amongst the expert
witnesses put forth by the two parties to the dispute. 32 While this may lead the
court to make more findings of fact about PHOSITA by clothing him or her
with attributes similar to the inventor, the crucial point is that the implication
of such conflated characterization is precisely the same as negative characteriza-
tion. By simultaneouslji accepting (1) the inventor as proxy for the skilled tech-
129. (2007), supra note 17 at para. 36.
130. As noted above, in only five decisions was explicit negative characterization observed. In
Mahurkar, Strayer J. concluded that "[i]f the invention was not obvious to Doctor Uldall
[who was himself an inventor as well as colleague of the patent-holder], it would not have
been obvious to a mere skilled but unimaginative technician." Supra note 97 at 433. Cullen
J. cited this passage with approval in Control Data, adopting the argument of counsel that
resolving the issue of obviousness is contingent upon finding a "Newman Darby" in each
case and determining whether the invention would be obvious to such a character. Supra
note 97. See also Windsurfing International Inc. v. BIC Sports Inc. (1985), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 241
at 259 (F.C.A.). In this case, Urie J. described Darby, the alleged prior inventor in the case,
as "unquestionably a person skilled in the art."
131. The coding system developed for the content analysis did not anticipate this tendency to
conflate PHOSITA and expert witnesses, and thus the exact number of cases in which this
occurred was not recorded. However, in nearly all decisions where explicit negative
characterization did not occur, it was apparent that the court was attempting to assess which
experts could best speak to what the PHOSITA would have known.
132. See e.g. Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc. (1997), 76 C.P.R. (3d) 150 (F.C.T.D.).
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nician and (2) the inventor's trials and tribulations as proof of non-obviousness,
PHOSITA necessarily becomes inferior.' This is what the Court of Appeal's
ruling in Apotex necessarily implied: negative characterization, just not in so
many words. Consider the relevant passage from Justice NoEl's decision on be-
half of the Court of Appeal in Apotex in its entirety:
Apotex further argues that Shore J. erred in confusing the inventor of the compound
(Mr. Badorc) with the ordinary person skilled in the art. According to Apotex, this
error was compounded when Shore J. concluded that, since Mr. Badorc did not eas-
ily arrive at the invention, it could not have been anticipated.
With respect, I do not believe that to be the case. Shore J. set the parameters of the
ordinary person skilled in the art, based on the description proposed by the parties at
paragraphs 18 and 19 of his reasons, and concluded at paragraph 69 that Mr. Badorc
"possessed the characteristics" of a person skilled in the art. In my view, this shows
that Shore J. did not equate Mr. Badorc to the notional construct of the skilled per-
son. Rather, he held that, although the inventor, Mr. Badorc also had the character-
istics of the person skilled in the art.
According to Shore J., even though Mr. Badorc possessed these characteristics, he
was still unable to separate the isomer "in every event and without the possibility of
error." Not only does this show that the prior art was lacking in clarity and direction
for the separation of the isomers in question, it also serves to demonstrate that, de-
spite Mr. Badorc's intuitive abilities, he was unable to replicate the experiment with-
out difficulty and without error.
Regardless of whether the court is willing to admit that this conflates the
expert with PHOSITA, 131 the fact of Mr. Badorc's struggles to arrive at the in-
vention in question was essentially determinative of the question of obvious-
ness. 36 PHOSITA's abilities must, by definition then, be inferior to those of
Mr. Badorc. And although counsel for Apotex did not succeed in persuading
the Court of Appeal of the gravity of this error, relativist characterizations of
PHOSITA, whether negative or conflated, explicit or implicit, should be of
significant concern for at least two reasons.
133. Because, in so doing, the court is relying upon the evidence of the patent-holder's experts as
to how challenging the process of arriving at the putative invention was, the court is necessarily
using the experts to set a benchmark that no ordinary skilled technician could hope to achieve.
134. Apotex (2006), supra note 20 at paras. 34-36 [citations omitted].
135. Ibid. According to Noel J.A., possessing the characteristics of PHOSITA somehow falls short
of equating the expert or inventor with PHOSITA.
136. Ibid. at para. 40.
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1. TENSION WITH THE STATUTE?
Intuitively, distinguishing PHOSITA from inventors would seem in keeping
with the policy of the PatentAct. "Inventors by definition are inventive, 13 Jus-
tice Hugessen remarked-thus, PHOSITA, by necessary implication, is not.
However, a closer reading of the legislation indicates that negative characteriza-
tion actually inverts the relationship between the knowledge or skill level of
PHOSITA and patentability. The Patent Act states that an invention is patentable
if, in addition to satisfying other criteria, the invention "would not have been
obvious on the claim date to a person skilled in the art or science to which it
pertains. " 138 In other words, PHOSITA serves as a "floor" for patentability. Yet,
by engaging in Novopharm- or Apotex-like negative characterization, courts are
actually imposing a "ceiling" on PHOSITA's capacity and inferring that the
invention is not obvious as a result. Negative characterization is thus technically
at odds with the wording of the Patent Act, not to mention circular: "defining
non-obviousness ... by reference to the skill level of PHOSITA, and then de-
fining PHOSITA's skill level by reference to capacity to make patentable (that
is, non-obvious) inventions."
139
2. PHOSITA DECONTEXTUALIZED: PART A
Moreover, this circularity creates a practical impediment to making obviousness
determinations. Rebecca Eisenberg explains:
If practitioners in a particular field tend to be innovative (or, for that matter, to get
patents), one must, apparently, consult the perspective of practitioners who have Less
than ordinary skill (or at least less than average skill) in order to maintain [the] pre-
sumption that PHOSITA "is not one who undertakes to innovate."
'
140
Patenting is indeed an increasingly common practice around the globe,'
1
even though it continues to vary across technological fields and settings.
4
1
137. Beloit, supra note 33 at 294.
138. Supra note 31, s. 28.3.
139. Eisenberg, supra note 9 at 892.
140. Ibid. [emphasis in original].
141. World Intellectual Property Organization, Press Release, "Unprecedented Number of
International Patent Filings in 2007" (21 February 2008), online: <http://www.wipo.int
pressroom/en/articles/2OO8/article_0006.html>.
142. Ibid. See also Aldo Geuna & Lionel J.J. Nesta, "University Patenting and its Effects on
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Eisenberg claims that this
sets the stage for a downward spiral in which the standard of patentability falls as
courts exclude patentees from consideration in assessing the skill level of PHOSITA,
making it easier to obtain patents, and leading inexorably to a further lowering of
judicial expectations for PHOSITA as yet more practitioners become patentees.7
As we have just seen, in Canada the analysis typically plays out a little differ-
ently. Courts do not a priori exclude patentees from consideration in assessing
the skill level of PHOSITA. Rather, they often rely directly upon patentees'
evidence to deduce what PHOSITA would not know. But, provided that nega-
tive characterization remains a strong tendency in Canada, judicial interpreta-
tions of PHOSITA will continue to diminish as Eisenberg predicts. Ultimately,
then, negative characterization will have the effect of decontextualizing PHO-
SITA from the modern research environment when that is precisely who he or
she was conceived to be: the ordinary scientist in situ.
C. HINDSIGHT IS...
The final problem observed in the jurisprudence stems from the weight given to
the hindsight concern. Courts have frequently recited the risk of hindsight bias
when experts espouse opinions as to the obviousness of an invention after the
fact. In Halocarbon,'" Justice Pigeon commented:
Practically all research work is done by looking in directions where the "state of the
art" points. On that basis and with hindsight, it could be said in most cases that
there was no inventive ingenuity in the new development because everyone would
then see how the previous accomplishments pointed the way. The discovery of peni-
cillin was, of course, a major development, a great invention. After that, a number of
workers went looking for other antibiotics methodically testing whole families of
various microorganisms other than penicillium notatum ... I cannot imagine patents
obtained for antibiotics and for various processes for their production being success-
fully challenged on the basis that the discovery of penicillin pointed the way and
there was no inventive ingenuity in the search for other antibiotics and in the testing
and the development of processes.
14 5
Justice Hugessen, not to be outdone, exclaimed as follows:
Academic Research: The Emerging European Evidence" (2006) 35 Res. Pol'y 790.
143. Supra note 9 at 892.
144. Supra note 46.
145. Ibid. at 944.
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It is so easy, once the teaching of a patent is known, to say, "I could have done that";
before the assertion can be given any weight, one must have a satisfactory answer to
the question "Why didn't you?"
146
This is a legitimate concern." 7 Allowing the hindsight concern to do the
bulk of the analytical work nevertheless presents a problem, again, for at least
two reasons.
1. THE HYPOTHETICAL FRAME
The accepted protocol for determining whether an invention is obvious requires
the court to turn its mind to what Eisenberg calls a "hypothetical frame of ref-
erence." '148 This frame is comprised of two elements: the first relates to what
PHOSITA knows and can do--the focus of much of the foregoing-whereas
the second requires the court to cast its mind back to the claimed date of inven-
tion. While intertwined, these two elements guard against two very different
forms of risk. Eisenberg explains:
The risk posed by evaluating obviousness at a later date rather than "at the time the
invention was made" is that the bar will be set too high. The risk posed by assigning
the evaluation to a decision-maker who does not have ordinary skill in the art is that
the bar will be set too low.
149
Fixating on the hindsight concern-which deals with the issue of timing,
only without giving adequate consideration to PHOSITA's skill and knowl-
edge-thus leaves the second risk unguarded against.
2. PHOSITA DECONTEXTUALIZED: PART B
Placing undue weight upon the hindsight concern is problematic for a second
reason. In the jurisprudence, the poignant question directed at experts by Justice
Hugessen is typically invoked in rhetorical fashion-that is, no "satisfactory
answer" is expected. This reveals an assumption on the part of the judiciary:
experts and inventors contesting the non-obviousness of an invention against
allegations of infringement are presumed to enjoy "freedom to operate." As one
146. Beloit, supra note 33 at 295.
147. See e.g. Gregory N. Mandel, "Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational" (2006) 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1391.
148. Supra note 9 at 887.
149. Ibid. at 888.
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justice of the Federal Court recently observed, however, such an assumption
may not always be sound:
But was it open to others to experiment with and address the problem while the base
patents, all of them held by Pfizer, were still active? ... The capsules came out in 1992,
the '071 patent application was filed in 1994. There was not much time to conduct
research on the food effect problem. In those circumstances, I find it difficult to ac-
cept the argument that if it wasn't novel [sic], why didn't someone else do it?150
True, the Patent Act does permit use of a patented product or process in
connection with the "development and submission of information required
under the law of Canada, a province or a country other than Canada that regu-
lates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product."'' A common
law experimental use defence to patent infringement may also still apply,'52 even
though its underlying rationale is now open to question given that an increasing
amount of basic research has commercial implications. 
153
However, without greater scrutiny of (1) the assumption that freedom to
operate exists, (2) findings of fact about the industry or technological field in
question, and (3) the particular use that the patented invention was being put
towards, the notion that would-be users of the technology are free to do as they
please may no longer hold. The net effect is that PHOSITA is once again at risk
of being decontextualized from the modern scientific environment in which he
or she is supposed to reside.
V. CONCLUSIONS: CAUSES AND CHANGES
In the end, it appears Justice Hugessen's colourful depiction of the mythical
ordinary skilled technician in Beloit has had a tremendous impact. PHOSITA
remains very much in the realm of myth: not only detached from reality, but
150. Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., supra note 92 at para. 129. Despite using the word
"novelty," Mosley J. was dealing with the issue of obviousness at this point in his analysis.
151. Supra note 31, ss. 55.2(1)-(6).
152. For the decision in which such a defence was fourrd to apply, see Micro Chemicals Limited et
al. v. Smith Kline &French Inter-American Corporation, [1972] S.C.R. 506.
153. That universities now aim to commercialize much academic research clearly informed the
Federal Circuit's decision to restrict the experimental use defense to use of a patented
invention "solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry." See Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 at 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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also from the legal exercise of determining obviousness. Forces beyond Justice
Hugessen's poetic words were, however, involved in bringing this about, in-
cluding (1) judicial pragmatism, (2) the limitations of expert evidence within an
adversarial system, (3) the unintended framing effect of claim construction upon
the obviousness inquiry, and (4) an impoverished understanding of the purpose
of the non-obviousness test and the relative roles and importance of patents, as
well as the public domain, to innovation.
The foregoing has only touched upon the first of these intertwined forces,
suggesting that PHOSITA's common sense and tacit knowledge are all but
ignored by the court owing to its deeply engrained pragmatic preference for
the written record."' This pragmatism, in turn, renders consideration of these
two capacities a non-event. In contrast, where the capacity in question is less
removed from the prior art-for example, PHOSITA's ability to conduct lit-
erature reviews-the court's pragmatism becomes a strength: the requirement
for evidence that PHOSITA would be able to find the prior art in question
means that he or she begins to transcend the line between fiction and fact.
Judicial pragmatism also partially helps to explain negative characterization.
However, the limitations of expert evidence and PHOSITA's role in patent
claim construction are also critical factors. Careful explanation is needed to
illustrate this and further develop the argument as to why the jurisprudence in
general, and negative characterization (whether express or implied) in particu-
lar, mask a fundamental misunderstanding of innovation.
A. BEHIND DOCTRINE: AN IMPOVERISHED UNDERSTANDING OF
INNOVATION
Justice Binnie framed the rationale for PHOSITA's involvement in claim con-
struction as follows:
The involvement in claims construction of the skilled addressee holds out to the pat-
entee the comfort that the claims will be read in light of the knowledge provided to
the court by expert evidence on the technical meaning of the terms and concepts
used in the claims. The words chosen by the inventor will be read in the sense the
inventor is presumed to have intended, and in a way that is sympathetic to accom-
plishment of the inventor's purpose expressed or implicit in the text of the claims.
However, if the inventor has misspoken or otherwise created an unnecessary or trou-
blesome limitation in the claims, it is a self-inflicted wound. The public is entitled to
154. Patent Act, supra note 31, s. 28.3 (specifically directing the court toward the prior art).
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rely on the words used provided the words used are interpreted fairly and knowl-
edgeably.
155
Notice the absence of qualifiers such as "ordinary" or "unimaginative" to
describe PHOSITA in this oft-quoted principle of interpretation. For the pur-
pose of claim construction, then, PHOSITA assumes the mantle of a skilled
reader rather than an ordinary, unimaginative technician. PHOSITA is a per-
son with a "mind willing to understand" or a person who is trying to "achieve
success" when he or she is deployed for the purposes of patent claim construc-
tion. 5 6 As a result, the expert witnesses offered by the parties to the litigation
are, practically by definition, capable of speaking to what such a skilled reader
would deduce from the patent's claims in the light of the prior art. The issue
for the court at the point of claim construction is therefore to determine which
expert's interpretation appears the most persuasive or plausible.
At the point of resolving the issue of obviousness-a step that is necessarily
post claim construction 157 -the court must instead determine whether the puta-
tive invention would be obvious to the unimaginative, ordinary skilled techni-
cian. Here, experts, many of whom are likely to have patents of their own,
would seem much less proximal to PHOSITA.
PHOSITA's role in claim construction may thus indirectly set the stage for
negative characterization. Sometimes it is explicit, as in Novopharm. More often,
the court visibly struggles through the awkward exercise of finding a suitable
"proxy" for this unimaginative being amongst the experts-the same experts
who, a moment ago, purported to supply the perspective of the skilled reader.
To the extent the court finds a given expert credible and his or her evidence
helpful to claim construction, turning around and dubbing him or her "ordi-
nary" and lacking even a "scintilla of inventiveness" ' 8 would seem a plain insult.
The Supreme Court of Canada has not contemplated the awkward logistics
of this evidentiary issue."5 9 And therein lies a window into the Court's impover-
ished understanding of innovation.
155. Free World Trust, supra note 59 at para. 51 (emphasis in original].
156. Ibid. at para. 44.
157. Ibid. at para. 19; Whirlpool, supra note 59 at para. 43.
158. This phrase has been used by Canadian courts on several occasions. See e.g. Diversified
Products, supra note 62; Halocarbon, supra note 46.
159. That the'construction of the patent's claims was not at issue in Apotex may partially explain
this. See Apotex (2008), supra note 15 at para. 76.
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Justice Binnie's remarks in Free World Trust evince a conviction that PHO-
SITA's place in claim construction is sound because it serves the bargain between
the patentee and the public. In a sense, the non-obviousness requirement, where
PHOSITA also supposedly plays an integral role, also speaks to the bargain
between the patentee and the public by demarcating what is already known
(i.e., knowledge in the public domain or previously patented) from that which
is not. It is therefore worth asking whether PHOSITA's diminished role in the
obviousness inquiry, as a result of negative characterization, is an acceptable
trade-off, given his or her newfound prominence in claim construction. Does
narrowing the scope of a patent through the eyes of a skilled reader during claim
construction essentially achieve the same thing as finding that an invention
would be obvious to PHOSITA?
Richard Gold and Karen Durell argue that the purposive construction test
espoused in Free World Trust and Whirlpool, and the renewed emphasis placed
upon the skilled reader therein, marks an important shift in Canadian patent
law, one which better balances the interests of the public as against those of
patentees. They also argue that those judicial holdings ensure that PHOSITA
serves as a flexible yet transparent tool to delimit the boundaries of monopoly
rights. 6 That may be the case; however, the content analysis performed here
shows that PHOSITA is not transparent insofar as courts generally fail to specify
his or her level of education or experience, or make any other finding of fact
regarding PHOSITA's identity. More fundamentally, it is inaccurate to equate
PHOSITA's function in claim construction with his or her function in deter-
mining an invention's obviousness.161
During claim construction, PHOSITA translates to the public what is and
what is not the property of the patentee. Knowledge that is not the property of
the patentee may be the property of someone else, potential property that has
yet to be claimed, or knowledge that forms part of the public domain. Note,
though, that triaging knowledge outside the instant patent into one of these three
categories is of no concern at the claim construction phase.
With respect to obviousness, where PHOSITA is fulfilling a gate-keeping
function, triaging is exactly what transpires. If the claimed invention is deter-
160. E. Richard Gold & Karen Lynne Durell, "Innovating the Skilled Reader: Tailoring Patent
Law to New Technologies" (2005) 19 I.P.J. 189 at 192.
161. To be fair, Gold and Durell do not equate these two functions.
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mined to be obvious, then that means it is already part of the public domain,
and, as such, it can never be the subject of a patent monopoly.
Because of this difference in function-translation versus gate-keeping-
and the different implications about knowledge associated with each function,
the trade-off is not equal. Increasing PHOSITA's role in claim construction
may keep some knowledge in the public domain and may temporarily stall the
appropriation of knowledge that is as yet unclaimed. But undermining PHO-
SITA's role in the obviousness inquiry allows knowledge that should, in principle,
remain permanently in the public domain to be lost for a twenty-year period of
patent protection.
We might still think that this is defensible on balance if we assume that
there is a strong relationship between patents and innovation. That is, the loss
of knowledge from the public domain should not be of grave concern because
patents are the primary driver of innovative activity. This view appears deeply
entrenched amongst the judiciary," 2 occasionally manifesting itself in statements
of meta-truth."'
However, nothing could be further from what we know.16" ' To begin, the
reality, so far as we can discern it, is that the strength of the relationship between
patents and innovation varies depending on the type of technology in question
and a host of other market and non-market factors. 6 ' Save for the pharmaceu-
tical and biotechnology sectors, patents appear to matter very little relative to
other types of advantages or assets.16' And even in the pharmaceutical and bio-
technology sectors, some now argue that patents in and of themselves are be-
coming less integral to a firm's success. 67
162. E. Richard Gold et aL, "The Unexamined Assumptions of Intellectual Property: Adopting an
Evaluative Approach to Patenting Biotechnological Innovation" (2004) 18 Pub. Aff. Q. 299
at 304ff.
163. See e.g. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 [Harvard].
In Harvard, Binnie J. (dissenting) chose the following opening words: "Innovation is said to
be the lifeblood of a modern economy. We neglect rewarding it at our peril" (at para. 4).
164. For a detailed summary of the empirical literature about patents and innovation, see Bronwyn
H. Hall, "Patents and Patent Policy" (2007) 23 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol'y 568 at 574-75.
165. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, "Policy Levers in Patent Law" (2003) 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575.
166. See e.g. Stuart J.H. Graham et aL, "High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey" Berkeley Tech. L.J. [forthcoming], online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1429049>.
167. This partially stems from the ongoing, tumultuous shift within and across these two sectors,
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A necessary corollary to this is that the public domain remains critical to
innovation. How critical, again, appears to vary by industry. But the general
importance of the public domain cannot be questioned. Studies of the transfer
of knowledge from the university research setting to the private sector, for ex-
ample, consistently demonstrate that patenting and licensing only account for a
fraction of total knowledge flows." 8 And all sectors of industry report valuing
knowledge-both codified and tacit knowledge-gained from the university
through traditional means (i.e., publications, conference presentations, student
mentoring and hiring) more than knowledge acquired through patent licences.' 69
Put differently, patents rarely teach.17 On the contrary, empirical evidence shows
that academic scientists essentially look everywhere but the patent literature for
information about developments in their respective fields of activity. 7' Scien-
tists working in firms consult the patent literature more so than their academic
peers, but it is by no means the source they most rely upon.'72 And yet courts
often appear to ignore the importance of the public domain entirely.
The point here is not whether one realm (proprietary versus non-
proprietary) is more important than the other.'73 Patents clearly do serve as ex
from a business model geared towards developing "simple small molecule" pharmaceuticals
to one intent on generating "large complex molecule" biopharmaceuticals or "biologics." In
this new age of biopharmaceuticals, first-mover advantage is potentially far more important
than patent rights per se, although firms do typically seek to pair the two strategies. See
Gregory N. Mandel, "The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry's Unintended Admission that
Biotech Patents Fail Enablement" (2006) 11 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1.
168. See Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge
Transfer from MIT" (2002) 48 Mgmt. Sci. 44.
169. See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, "Links and Impacts: The
Influence of Public Research on Industrial R&D" (2002) 48 Mgmt. Sci. 1.
170. For an interesting attempt to modify patent law doctrine in the United States so that patents
might teach, see Sean B. Seymore, "The Teaching Function of Patents" Notre Dame L. Rev.
[forthcoming in 2010], online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1352044>.
171. John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, "Where Excludability Matters: Material
versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research" (2007) 36 Res. Pol'y 1184 at
1189.
172. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., "R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in
Japan and the United States" (2002) 31 Res. Pol'y 1349 at 1362-64.
173. The findings of one provocative study are worth noting, however:
In perhaps one of the most startling papers on the economics of innovation published in the
past few years, Josh Lerner looked at changes in intellectual property law in sixty countries
over a period of 150 years. He studied close to three hundred policy changes, and found that,
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ante and expost incentives for research and development." 4 Rather, the point is
that the relative importance of patents to innovation will always be context-
dependent. And by failing to adequately characterize PHOSITA for the pur-
poses of the non-obviousness inquiry, the court is undercutting the primary
tool at its disposal for developing a patent law standard that is reflective of the
industry-specific nature of innovation.
7
5
Accordingly, a richer understanding of innovation is needed. The next two
sections of this article thus formulate changes that ought to be made at the doc-
trinal, institutional, and theoretical levels in order to improve the application of
the non-obviousness requirement in Canada and restore its purpose in light of
our improved understanding of innovation.
B. FIRST ORDER CHANGE: THE DOCTRINE
1. OBVIOUSNESS REALISM
At the doctrinal level, the primary goal should be to create a framework for, or
remove barriers to, an "obviousness analysis based in the real world."'76 In other
both in developing countries and in economically advanced countries that already have
patent law, patenting both at home and abroad by domestic firms of the country that made
the policy change, a proxy for investment in research and development, decreases when
patent law is strengthened!
Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and
Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) at 39, citing Josh Lerner, "Patent
Protection and Innovation Over 150 Years" (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper No. 8977, 2002), online: <http:llwww.nberg.orglpapers/w8977>. Another
interesting study that relates more directly to the topic of this article found that "relaxing the
standard of nonobviousness creates a tradeoff-raising the probability of obtaining a patent,
but decreasing its value. We show that weaker nonobviousness requirements can lead to less
R&D activity, and this is more likely to occur in industries that rapidly innovate" [emphasis
in original]. Robert M. Hunt, "Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform" (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Working Paper No. 99-3, March 1999), Abstract, online: <http:llwww.philadelphiafed.orgl
research-and-data/publications/working-papers/ 1 9991wp99-3.pdf>.
174. Neither of these justifications for patent rights is perfect, but firms clearly do see them as
such. See Mark A. Lemley, "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property"
(2004) 71 U. Chicago L. Rev. 129.
175. Burk and Lemley suggest that PHOSITA is perhaps the most "fundamental policy lever" to
ensure that patent law is industry-specific. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 27 at 114-17.
176. Durie and Lemley have persuasively argued that this is what the US Supreme Court hoped,
but failed, to achieve in KSR. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 107 at 28.
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words, the focus should be on enabling the court to decipher, in each case,
"whether scientists in this particular discipline [or field of research] would be-
lieve this particular invention to be obvious."' 7 In theory, Apotex marks a posi-
tive development in this regard. By adopting the UK Pozzoli-modified version
of the Windsurfing test for obviousness,17 8 the Supreme Court of Canada has
provided a framework for more fact-driven analyses. Identifying PHOSITA and
his or her common general knowledge is now the first step in the inquiry, as
opposed to simply being one amongst several factors to be considered. 79
Perhaps an even more promising change is that Apotex appears to lift the
blanket prohibition against routine experimentation. 8 ' Because the evidence
indicated that well-known techniques were used to arrive at the invention,18 1 one
of the key issues in dispute between the parties was whether an "obvious to try"
standard should ever be invoked in determining obviousness.' 82 Contrary to
rulings below, Justice Rothstein opined that an "obvious to try" test for obvi-
ousness may be legitimate in certain circumstances-for example, in the phar-
maceutical industry, where "there may be many chemically similar structures that
can elicit different biological responses and offer the potential for significant
therapeutic advances."' 83 In addition to taking into account the field or context
of invention, whether "routine trials" versus "prolonged and arduous" experimen-
tation were necessary may be a helpful factor to consider in deciding whether the
"obvious to try" standard is appropriate. 8" Thus, in a convoluted way, the Court
implied that routine experimentation can, in some cases, be undertaken.'85
177. Ibid. at 12 [emphasis in original].
178. See Pozzdli, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
179. Apotex (2008), supra note 15 at para. 67.
180. Ibid. at para. 69.
181. Ibid. at para. 85.
182. Ibid. at para. 82. Ultimately, Rothstein J. held that Shore J. had erred in not allowing such a
standard to be used in the case.
183. Ibid. at para. 68.
184. Ibid. at para. 69.
185. What should matter most, then, is not the "routineness" of the experimentation per se, but
whether it was routine to conduct such (known, accepted) experiments in arriving at the
invention in dispute, taking into account the context in which the research was performed.
For example, if the "inventive spark" lay not in the doing of those (routine) tests, but in some
prior association or idea, then the fact of having to conduct such experiments should not by
itself bar a finding of obviousness. Rather, the inquiry should shift its focus to whether that
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However, there are reasons to doubt that this holding will help judicial
decision-making beyond cases involving pharmaceutical selection patents-that
is, that it will inspire more fact-driven analyses across the board. There remains
a risk that the decision will be interpreted as placing the primary emphasis upon
determining whether a particular standard (the "worth a try" standard) is ap-
propriate in the pharmaceutical context instead of ensuring that PHOSITA's
ability to engage in experimentation is rooted in an understanding of the prac-
tices and techniques of the invention's field, much less an understanding of
PHOSITA's specific abilities.186 Further, as shown above, there is a systematic
failure to achieve the latter at courts of first instance.
187
This broader problem was not before the Supreme Court of Canada. The
identity of PHOSITA-a "trained pharmachemist"-was agreed to by the parties
and Justice Rothstein simply reiterated Justice Shore's findings of fact about the
different experimental techniques being well-known to the skilled person.'88
Other contested features of PHOSITA (e.g., his or her common sense) as well
as the obviousness analysis more generally (e.g., the import of secondary consid-
erations) were simply not at issue in the case. Consequently, Apotex leaves much
work to be done, even at the doctrinal level.
To begin, there remains a need to re-emphasize that obviousness is a factual
inquiry. 89 As such, characterizing PHOSITA through specific findings of fact-
determining not only what level of education and experience he or she has, but
prior association or idea was known to someone skilled in the art. The Pozzoli-modified
Windsurfing test builds this insight into its step-by-step obviousness analysis, requiring the
court to try to idehtify the "inventive concept" at the heart of the patent's claim. In the
absence of such a requirement, the Federal Court appears to have turned its mind to
identifying the inventive spark or concept only once in connection with obviousness. See
GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 120 at para. 66.
186. Indeed, in one of the first decisions to consider the Supreme Court's holding inApotex
(2008), supra note 15, one of the two main issues under appeal was whether the newly
adopted "worth a try" standard had been correctly applied. See Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Canada
Inc. (2009), 72 C.P.R. (4th) 141 (F.C.A.).
187. One exception is Mobil Oil Corp. v. Hercules Canada Inc. (1994), 57 C.P.R. (3d) 488
(F.C.T.D.). In that case, Wetston J. remarked that the idea of PHOSITA representing a
.composite" of scientists, researchers, and technicians is "particularly true where the
invention relates to a science or art that transcends several scientific disciplines" (at 494).
188. Apotex (2008), supra note 15 at paras. 74-75.
189. To reiterate, only eight decisions in the pool of fifty-two explicitly framed non-obviousness
as a factual inquiry. See Part III, above.
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also the specific norms and practices associated with the technological field of
the invention and the context in which PHOSITA performs his or her work-
is critically important. Is PHOSITA working in a publicly-funded laboratory or
private industry? Does the invention transcend several scientific disciplines or
does it fit within the confines of a single field? These sorts of contextual factors
are highly relevant to the exercise of defining PHOSITA's capacities. Private
industry, as a setting, provides little incentive to publish research relative to an
academic institution. At the very least, then, if PHOSITA is found to be work-
ing within industry, it should highlight the need to pay special attention to
PHOSITA's tacit knowledge. If PHOSITA is engaged in a transdisciplinary
area of research, his or her ability to draw inferences from one scientific field
and assess their relevance to another, as vell as to synthesize developments from
several scientific fields, should by definition be greater than a PHOSITA work-
ing in one discipline alone. As science continues to evolve, and more transdisci-
plinary areas of inquiry or modes of research emerge (such as "bioinformatics,"
"nanotechnology," and "synthetic biology"), it will be increasingly important to
take into account the context in which PHOSITA lives, thinks, and acts in
order to arrive at accurate characterizations of his or her capacities.
On a related note, PHOSITA's capacity for common sense and basic rea-
soning should be reaffirmed. Here, though, the best remedy may be indirect.
PHOSITA as "paragon of deduction and dexterity" has all but disappeared
since Beloit, not because this quality is now lost from the court's lexicon, but
because of the emphasis upon the prior art as naked text, disrobing PHOSITA
of his or her ability to research or think about how various texts speak to one
another. The flag or mosaic analogy is helpful in distinguishing anticipation
from obviousness, but it appears to lead the court to concentrate upon what the
prior art, item-by-item, literally says rather than what the prior art conveys on an
item-by-item, as well as aggregated, basis."'
To correct this, renewed emphasis needs to be placed upon how (and to
what extent) the skilled technician would synthesize all of the prior art together
in light of his or her skills and knowledge, including his or her tacit knowledge.
The mosaic analogy may be retained, but equal attention should be paid to the
process of integrating the various prior art elements comprising the mosaic as
the elements themselves.
190. This is, perhaps, understandable, given the extremely technical nature of the prior art.
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On the other hand, certain holdings and features of the obviousness analy-
sis post-Beloit continue to resonate with the real world and should therefore be
preserved. Requiring evidence that PHOSITA would have, in fact, been knowl-
edgeable of a particular piece of prior art fits in this category, especially where
the prior art in dispute is a patent, because certain scientists may be far less aware
of patents than others. 9"
The relevance of secondary considerations should also be preserved, yet
clarified significantly. This prescription may come as a surprise, given that
secondary factors have been blamed for rnarginalizing PHOSITA from the US
obviousness test prior to KSR' 92-roughly the same harm sought to be avoided
here, even though the content analysis did not reveal an over-reliance on secon-
dary factors by Canadian courts. HoWever, when properly understood, these
factors can provide a more reliable indicator of an invention's obviousness rela-
tive to expert testimony."'
All of these factors form part of Canadian jurisprudence, but it is not clear
that courts understand why some factors-failure of others and teaching
away'94-are in principle more probative than others. Evidence of commercial
success is, for instance, dismissed as irrelevant as often as it is accepted as com-
pelling because the court sees it as attributable to marketing instead of true in-
vention. Rarely, if ever, does the court attempt to assess whether the claims of
the patented invention are "co-extensive" with the commercially successful
product, in which case the evidence should be given some weight notwithstand-
ing inarketing efforts."9  The harder case to decide will be where the nexus be-
tween secondary considerations and the invention is strong and thus supports
the invention's non-obviousness, but the evidence as to what PHOSITA would
know, et cetera, points in the opposite direction. Until the problem of negative
characterization is corrected, that sort of difficult choice is one that the court is
unlikely to face.
191. See Walsh, Cohen & Cho, supra note 171.
192. See e.g. Eisenberg, supra note 9.
193. One can, for example, "criticize evidence of copying or acquiescence as circular, since patent
enforcement can cause the marketplace to fall into line, taking a licence even to patents they
believe should never have been issued." See Durie & Lemley, supra note 107 at 18-19.
194. Ibid.
195. But see Samsonite Corp. v. Holiday Luggage Inc. (1988), 20 C.P.R. (3d) 291 (F.C.T.D.). This
case provides the lone example of the court turning its mind to this issue.
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2. ADDRESSING NEGATIVE CHARACTERIZATION
As argued above, PHOSITA's involvement in claim construction appears to pre-
cipitate both types of negative characterization. A certain degree of conceptual
incoherence results, as PHOSITA appears to be "everywhere yet nowhere" in
the analysis.196 The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Apotex may even
invite more negative characterization by welcoming evidence about the "history
of the invention" in dispute, as well as the knowledge of those involved in bring-
ing it about, such as Mr. Badorc.'97 Ironically, Justice Rothstein noted that the
"knowledge of those involved in finding the invention" may be particularly useful
where it is "no lower than what would be expected of the skilled person,"198 when
the tendency in the jurisprudence is to hold the inventor(s) in higher regard
than PHOSITA. Clearly, the Supreme Court was either not cognizant of this
tendency, or it did not grasp that negative characterization is at odds with the
Patent Act and capable of spawning a PHOSITA with less than ordinary skill.
As such, the primary doctrinal change, suggested in the preceding sub-section,
of ensuring that PHOSITA be fully characterized in his or her own right may
be insufficient to fix the problem. To fully combat negative characterization,
whether in its manifest Novopharm form, or in its PHOSITA-conflated Apotex
analog, the source of th6 evidence regarding who PHOSITA is, what he or she
knows, and what he or she can accomplish should be altered.
The court should diversify the sources of information that PHOSITA is based
upon, depending on the function that he or she is asked to carry out. Instead of
having party experts act as the sole supplier of PHOSITA's characteristics for both
claim construction and obviousness purposes, the court should also receive evi-
dence from patent examination officials at the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office (CIPO) about what the skilled technician would know, et cetera, for the
purpose of determining obviousness. Party experts could continue to speak to
the boundaries of the patented invention, as interpreted by the skilled reader,199
196. That PHOSITA plays an identifiable role in several frequently-litigated patent law issues has
been the subject of commentary for some time. As regards the United States, see e.g. John 0.
Tresansky, "PHOSITA - The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law" (1991) 73
J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 37. That PHOSITA is seldom identified by way of factual
findings is, however, an observation that has, until now, never been demonstrated in Canada.
197. Apotex (2008), supra note 15 at paras. 70-71.
198. Ibid. at para. 70 [emphasis added].
199. Doing so would seem appropriate, given PHOSITA's translational function at the claim
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as well as to the invention's obviousness. CIPO officials, on the other hand, cotild
provide a disinterested (or at least less-interested) source of information about
PHOSITA's knowledge and capacities. Moreover, by opening up the sources of
evidence that inform PHOSITA's identity to include not only expert inventors,
but also patent examiners-individuals whom, as at least two commentators
have contended, are much more legitimate PHOSITA proxies 2"'-the court
may be less inclined to fall into either type of negative characterization trap.
In terms of mechanics, patent examiners need not appear in court to be so
involved. Rather, institutional reform on the part of CIPO is needed. At the
time of examination, the examiner should be permitted to rely on his or her
own knowledge, common sense, and experience in the technological field (as
opposed to simply the prior art and other evidence provided by the putative
patentee) to deem a patent obvious." 1 The examiner should document in writ-
ing his or her reasons for thinking that PHOSITA would or would not be able
to come up with the invention under review, and, in the event of determining
that the invention is obvious, provide the patent applicant with an opportunity
to rebut those reasons (through argument and/or by submitting an affidavit
explaining the knowledge or ability of those skilled in the art).
202
Legally, integrating this paper trail (or "file wrapper," as it is known in the
United States) into the obviousness determination should not, in principle, be a
problem. In Free World Trust, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the file
wrapper cannot be used as evidence for claim construction, but left the door open
for other purposes, including, presumably, obviousness.0 3
This solution is admittedly imperfect, if not also potentially artificial. At the
judicial level, it may effectively result in two PHOSITAs-the skilled reader
construction stage. This role serves to mediate the interests of patent-holders and the
public-interests corresponding directly to the patent-holding party and the alleged infringer
in the instant litigation.
200. Eisenberg, supra note 9 at 898-99; Durie & Lemley, supra note 107 at 24.
201. The current Manual of Patent Office Practice lacks a provision allowing an examiner to deny
a patent application based upon his or her knowledge, common sense, or experience. See
Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Manual of Patent Office Practice (Ottawa: Industry
Canada), c. 13 at 13-15 ("Examinations of Applications"), online: <http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/
eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/chapitre13-chapteri3-eng.pdf/$file/chapitrel3-
chapter 1 3-eng.pdf>.
202. Durie & Lemley, supra note 107 at 23.
203. See Free World Trust, supra note 59 at paras. 66-67.
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tasked with claim construction and the ordinary technician deployed for obvi-
ousness-and it remains to be seen whether two (hypothetical) heads are better
than one. From an institutional perspective, CIPO already faces tremendous
time and resource constraints: while the backlog of patent applications may be
less than in larger markets (such as the United States and Europe), the total time
examiners are able to devote to each patent application is presumably not that
much greater than, for example, the eighteen or so hours that United States
Patent and Trademark Office examiners are able to afford. '
However, this proposal would seem less taxing on the system than integrat-
ing review by neutral outside experts into the patent examination process-a
proposal being explored in the United States. 5 and already in place in the United
Kingdom.206 At bottom, though, it is important to bolster the obviousness re-
quirement for innovation's sake, despite these institutional challenges.
C. SECOND ORDER CHANGE: INNOVATION THEORY
Much of the foregoing critique could be construed as a complaint with the un-
creative, unimaginative, uninventive, or non-innovative character commonly
ascribed to PHOSITA. Some would contend that this defining trait, however
termed, is inevitable. If an invention is determined to be within PHOSITA's
power to produce or know, and, therefore, undeserving of the title "invention,"
then why not characterize him or her as uninventive? Even if patenting be-
comes ordinary practice within a particular field, paradoxically relegating PHO-
SITA-a creature without even a "scintilla of inventiveness"-to the realm of
the extraordinary, this outcome would still seem to flow inexorably from the lan-
guage of the Patent Act and the very task PHOSITA was conceived to perform.
Taking the argument advanced here to its logical extreme, in other words, critics
may charge that altering the policy embodied- by the Patent Act so as to recog-
nize PHOSITA's creativity is not possible.
204. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 107 at 19. The authors describe this eighteen hours as the
total time that US patent examiners need in order to do several tasks, including an evaluation
of the invention's obviousness.
205. See Beth Simone Noveck, "'Peer to Patent': Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and
Patent Reform" (2006) 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 123; Eisenberg, supra note 9 at 899-905. But
see Durie & Lemley, supra note 107 at 21 (arguing against this approach).
206. See Patents Act 1977 (U.K.), 1977, c. 37, s. 21. The Act allows anyone (not simply "neutral
experts") to submit arguments and evidence on the patentability of an invention, including
with respect to whether the putative invention involves an inventive step.
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That criticism may attach to arguments advanced by others-most notably,
Ron Bouchard's efforts to legitimize PHOSITA's inventive abilities within the
pharmaceutical context.07 Although grounded in the same understanding of
innovation theory as Bouchard's argument, the problem identified in the juris-
prudence and the correction called for here is much more basic.
The innovation-related problem in the jurisprudence does not stem from
PHOSITA's unrecognized inventiveness, innovativeness, or creativity. Rather,
it stems from the fact that the court commonly and casually interchanges these
terms. This is a problem, because treating these terms as though they were syn-
onymous-particularly invention and innovation-fundamentally confuses
ends and means. The core purpose of the Canadian patent system is to facilitate
innovation. But, as explained in the foregoing, the relationship between patents
and innovation is not one-to-one. Treating innovative capacity and inventive-
ness as essentially equivalent therefore flies in the face of this empirical reality.
And, significantly, it also necessarily discounts the sphere of knowledge and skill
that, according to the statute, PHOSITA has legitimate access to-knowledge in
the public domain-which may, in some industries, be more important to in-
novation than patents.
Arriving at a contextually-characterized PHOSITA is, once again, the pri-
mary means within the court's control to guard against this. A second, related
tactic is to reframe the purpose of the non-obviousness criterion in view of the
dual importance of the public domain and patented knowledge to innovation.08
Such a refraining might read as follows: Non-obviousness serves to identify sig-
nificant departures from what is already known, recognizing that both patented
knowledge and knowledge in the public domain are integral to innovation.
This wording of the purpose arguably muddies the distinction between non-
obviousness and novelty. The proposed language may also be interpreted as
207. See Ron A. Bouchard, "Should Scientific Research in the Lead-up to Invention Vitiate
Obviousness under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations: To Test or
Not To Test?" (2007) 6 C.J.L.T. 1; Ron A. Bouchard, "Living Separate and Apart is Never
Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie that Binds Obviousness and
Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical Litigation" (2007) 4 U.O.L. & T.J. 1.
208. In this respect, too, the proposal made here is distinguishable from the change suggested by
Bouchard, ibid. Whereas Bouchard invokes the concept of purposive construction to focus
the inquiry on the essence of the invention, the proposal made here would frame the non-
obviousness requirement in terms of the function of the doctrine vis- -vis innovation more
broadly.
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setting a higher standard for non-obviousness. However, this merely re-illustrates
the insufficiency of words in terms of capturing true invention that judges have
long expressed. The real purpose of this new purposive frame is to underscore
the dual importance of the public domain and patented inventions. This, in
turn, helps to encourage future courts to engage in more contextual characteri-
zations of PHOSITA, so as to better position themselves to determine the ob-
viousness of an invention in a manner that reflects the industry-specific nature
of innovation.
D. A FINAL WORD ABOUT PHARMACEUTICAL SELECTION PATENTS
Having recently decided Apotex, the Supreme Court of Canada may unfortu-
nately not agree that such a reformulation of the obviousness doctrine, infused
with a richer understanding of innovation-one which concedes that knowledge
in the public domain may be just as crucial to innovation as patented inven-
tions-is needed. As this article has shown, however, the fundamental problem
transcending the law of obviousness in Canada was simply not raised. Perhaps
the actual outcome in Apotex was the correct one, notwithstanding the charac-
terization conflation that occurred: the evidence did seem to suggest that no one-
not the pharmaceutical company, not the inventor, and not the skilled per-
son-had previously theorized or predicted which of the two isomers separated
out from the racemate would prove effective and safe, notwithstanding that
known techniques were used. The company had previously pursued a differ-
ent path, which had resulted in significant losses of time and money." 9 On the
other hand, whether the majority of those losses are better traced to the devel-
opment of the active ingredient in the drug Plavix-as opposed to the various
patents covering the drug's metabolites, extended-release formulations, and
enantiomers, all of which are typically tacked on to extend the patent term-is,
perhaps, a question that merits more critical scrutiny.21  Assuming courts will
209. Apotex (2008), supra note 15 at para. 91.
210. Recall that the patent at issue in Apotex (2008), ibid., was a selection patent. The compound
at issue was actually encompassed by a prior, broader patent also held by the same drug
manufacturer, Sanofi, but which had expired in 2002. Some commentators argue that such
patents provide critical incentives for research and development. Others lament their
existence for effectively sanctioning the creation of non-innovative, "me-too" drugs. See
Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do
About It (New York: Random House, 2004) at 74ff. The more immediate issue for the
question of non-obviousness is whether the expenses incurred by Sanofi, which Rothstein J.
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always have imperfect information about the true costs of pharmaceutical re-
search and development, finding selection patents valid in principle may well be
a defensible patent policy choice. But unless the corrections suggested above are
made and the judiciary begins to demythologize PHOSITA by making findings
of fact in each case, the current chasm between patent law doctrine and the
patent system's central goal of promoting innovation will only widen.
accepted as being tied to the specific patented invention at issue, were actually linked to-the
research and development of the parent patent.
